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Abstract
The first chapter takes an overview of the Chinese steel industry. The intermediate
goods trade has become a significant feature of the international economy. Nev-
ertheless, questions regarding price negotiation and the determinants of importing
firms’ profitability remain unanswered. Using firm level data, we attempt to address
these issues in the context of the Chinese steel industry. Despite being the largest
producer of steel in the world, the Chinese steel industry has maintained a very
low level of profitability. This paper suggests that the low profitability of Chinese
steel producers results from the abnormally high degree of market segmentation in
China. A recently developed econometric method in panel data spatial analysis
is adopted here, to explain the level of geographic fragmentation in the Chinese
steel industry. Our results reveal that local steel production depends only on local
demand rather than on cross-region demand. Production is responsive, as a 10%
increase in local GDP induces more than 8% increase in local steel production, while
the cross-province spill-over demand is insignificant under several reasonable model
settings. Less efficient firms survive because of the segmented market, so Chinese
steel producers realize lower profit in the face of high input prices.
The second chapter develops a model of global supply chain to study how profits
are shared between intermediate input suppliers and final good producers. Dif-
ferences in market structures are shown to be main driving forces in profitability
differences along the global supply chain. Applying Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)’s
viii
framework of heterogeneous firms into the problem, we model the downstream (final
good) market as the monopolistic competition, while the upstream (intermediate in-
put) market in oligopolistic (Cournot) competition. We show how increases in the
entry cost in the upstream market and segmentations in the final good market in-
creases (decreases) the market power of intermediate input (final good) producers,
which increases (decreases) the profitability of intermediate input (final good) pro-
ducers. We also show how increases in the demand of the final good affect the price
of the intermediate input, which determines the profit sharing between intermedi-
ate input and final good producers. Using firm level data from the Chinese steel
industry, we calibrate the model. Our results show a 20% increase in the final good
demand would induce 25% increase in the input price. Our results also suggest
the regional trade costs in the Chinese steel market are about three times as firm’s
average marginal cost, and a 10% decrease in regional trade costs would lower the
input prices by 22%.
The third chapter estimates a dynamic structural model of firm investment and
importing decisions. Using firm level data from the Chinese steel industry, both
activities are found to have positive effects on productivity. Particularly, firms
engaging into both activities enjoy a 3.72% productivity premium in the long run.
Moreover, the result suggest that in the Chinese steel industry there is a huge entry
cost and fixed cost in the import market for raw materials. These costs create a self-
selection issue in the import market. After controlling for this issue, I find that more
productive firms benefit to a larger degree from importing. Furthermore, simulation
of the import market shows that a 10% decrease in entry and fixed costs would net
8.9% productivity gains for a typical firm.
Evidences presented in this dissertation shed lights on many aspects. First, it
firstly document the market structure in the Chinese steel industry, using a newly
developed panel data spatial analysis approach to reveal a segmented market in this
ix
industry; Second, we introduce the market vertical linkage to a classical new trade
model to show the relationship between the inter-regional trade barriers and the
upstream market price, which is a valuable contribution to the international trade
literature under the global value chain context; Last but not the least, firms’ im-
porting and investment behavior as well as their effects on productivity dynamics
are structurally estimated, so that the gains from import is well measured while
addressing the endogeneity issues. In all, my dissertation focuses on the low prof-
itability issue in the Chinese steel industry. Based on detailed firm level data, it
provides reasonable explanations from several perspectives, which also shows many
potentials for researches in the future.
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Chapter 1
Market Structure in The Chinese
Steel Industry
1.1 Introduction
The Chinese steel industry alone has been growing an average of 20% every year
over the past decade and is an important component of China’s economy. In 2008,
China’s total output of crude steel reached 500 million metric tons (mmt), and
accounted for 38% of the entire production in the world, compared to 5.1% in 1980.
Meanwhile, in 2008, China consumed 450 mmt of crude steel and exported 50 mmt
which was 15% of the world steel trade. Furthermore, the Chinese steel industry
absorbs a large part of employment in the Chinese economy. In 2008, there were
nearly two million people employed in over 300 firms.
On the other hand, the Chinese steel makers maintain a low level of profitability.
The average profitability, measured by the profit-sales ratio, is 3% in recent years,
comparing with 10% for the steel industries in other countries and 6% for other
Chinese manufacturing sectors. As pointed out by the Chinese steel association in
2012, the Chinese steel industry is “the least profitable” sector among all Chinese
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industries. In this paper, using firm level data, we attempt to answer the question
why the Chinese steel industry maintains a low profitability level, compared to other
Chinese manufacturing sectors and to steel industries in other countries.
China has been through a remarkable period of economic development during
the past three decades. Underlying this rapid growth, Chinese manufacturing firms
have shown improvement in their economic performance. Researchers have sug-
gested several factors as essential to Chinese firms’ productivity and profitability.
For example, Thompson (2003) and Adams et al. (2006) attribute Chinese firms’
productivity improvement to China’s open-economy policies, from which domestic
firms can obtain advanced technologies and management through spill-overs from
foreign direct investment.
At the same time, the intermediate goods trade has become an increasingly
prominent feature of the international economy. Hummels et al. (2001) point out
that intermediates comprise about 20% of total exports by value. Yeats (1998)
shows that the intermediate goods trade has grown faster than the trade of final
goods, suggesting a growing integration in global production. Meanwhile, prices for
intermediate goods often come from bilateral negotiations. Thus, firm bargaining
power becomes critical since input prices can strongly affect importers’ profitability.
Intuitively, a high level of demand from importers can reduce negotiated prices due
to the quantity discount. However, in some global commodity markets, such as
crude oil and iron ore markets, suppliers have the opportunity to collude and push
up prices. Therefore, the determinants behind firms’ bargaining powers warrant
attention.
For China, import dependence has become more severe recently. According to
the National Bureau of Statistics in China (CSB), 50% of crude oil, more than 70%
of iron ore, and around 50% of machine tools production in China are classified as
import-dependent. Research suggests that the relationship between Chinese manu-
2
facturing firms and their input suppliers abroad is very important for profitability.
Bernard et al. (2007), and Manova and Zhang (2009) find that there is a positive
relationship between productivity and imports in China: more productive firms are
more likely to import their inputs.
Besides their import dependence, Chinese firms are characterized by a low degree
of geographic concentration. Many sectors, like steel and petrochemical industries,
have firms widely dispersed around the country. Lu and Tao (2009) follow Ellison
and Glaeser (1997)’s method to measure the geographic concentration in Chinese
manufacturing sectors and find that most Chinese sectors are “not very concen-
trated.” Li and Lu (2009) use Chinese firm level data to show that geographic
concentration encourages firms’ vertical integration.
The Chinese steel industry deserves attention for many reasons. First, China
is now the biggest producer of steel in the world and continues to grow. Second,
market concentration in this industry is unusually low. Third, the Chinese steel
industry has maintained a very low profitability. Fourth, there is a clear contrast
between the state owned enterprizes (SOEs) and non-SOEs in this industry. Finally,
the Chinese steel industry is highly importing dependent on the primary input, iron
ore. This paper attributes the low profitability and many of these characteristics in
the Chinese steel industry to the underlying segmented market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 briefly reviews the
literature on inter-regional trade barriers. Section 1.3 introduces the data used in
this paper. Section 1.4 takes an overview on the Chinese steel industry. Section
1.5 uses spatial analysis to explain the segmentation in the Chinese steel industry.
Section 1.6 concludes.
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1.2 Literature Review
Recent studies (See Young (2000), Poncet (2005)) point out that although China is
more and more important in the international market, it is less integrated domes-
tically. Their empirical examination of inter-provincial trade data shows a decrease
in the level of inter-province exchanging in contrast to an increase in the level of
international purchasing. They argue that high trade barriers, which come from lo-
cal government protectionism, among Chinese provinces reduce inter-province trade.
Similarly, Poncet (2005) and Li and Lu (2009) also argue for the existence of sizable
inter-province trade barriers by examining price differentials of homogeneous goods
across regions in China.
On the other hand, other researchers have looked for evidence of trade barriers
within China by examining the convergence of output and growth and found mixed
results. For example, Zhang and Tan (2004) find convergence in products and labor
markets but not in capital markets. Also, Xu (2002) sees convergence of output
growth, while Xu and Voon (2003) and Fan and Wei (2006) confirm the convergence
of the price index across provinces in China. Naughton (2003) also finds that inter-
region trade barriers do exist in service and intermediate goods trade.
Trade barriers in the international trade literature could result from many as-
pects such as ice-burg costs (freight costs), tariffs, border effects, culture differences
like colonial heritage and so forth. However, trade barriers among different regions
within the same country could not take all of these forms. Examining anecdotal
evidence, some researchers discuss the effect of local government protectionism as
a type of inter-regional trade barriers (See Li et al. (2003), and Bai et al. (2004)).
For example, as in Li et al. (2003), local government in Shanghai approved the joint
venture of a local automobile firm with Volkswagen to be the only supplier for local
taxi cabs. Similarly, newspapers from Guangzhou are prohibited from sale in Shen-
zheng by the local Shenzheng government, despite being two neighboring cities (See
4
Gilley (2001)).
In China, local government protectionism often takes the form of non-tariff bar-
riers, such as purchasing quotas, license registration control, and fees for selling
non-local products. Since the economic reform of the late 1970s, local governments
have been assigned more administration and discretion over local economies, in con-
trast to the central planning era. As a result, local governments have an incentive
to protect their economies, especially their state owned enterprizes (SOEs), in order
to obtain higher levels of fiscal transfer and associated benefits.
Research has looked at local protectionism in China. Young (2000) argues that
local protectionism results from opportunistic rent-seeking by local governments
in a transition economy, and on-going reform would continue to create more such
opportunities so that the local protectionism is getting worse. Bai et al. (2004)
examine and compare local protectionism in different Chinese industrial sectors.
They find that local protectionism is higher in more profitable sectors, as well as
sectors with more SOEs. Meanwhile, Poncet (2005) measures the magnitude of inter-
province trade barriers in China, using the province level trade data. He estimates
the border effect through a gravity equation, and finds trade barriers among Chinese
provinces are high and rising. Also, he argues that local protectionism comes not
only from maximizing the local benefits, but also from stabilizing social economies.
Specifically, Ma et al. (2007) test the market integration in several Chinese energy
sectors by investigating price data from different cities. They conclude that gasoline
and diesel markets seem to be integrated, yet coal and electricity markets are not.
1.3 Data
The data for our analysis is from a newly released proprietary firm level data of
Chinese manufacturing firms over 1998-2007. This data is collected by the Chinese
5
Statistic Bureau (CSB) through annual enterprize surveys, and covers all firms with
annual revenue above 5 million Renminbi (RMB). It reports the main financial
summaries of each firm. All numbers are booked in current values, which we deflate
into net values with associated price indices.1
All firms are coded into four-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) code.
The Chinese steel industry is narrowed to firms with code number 3220 (steel refin-
ery) to restrict our analysis.2 The original ownership is coded into 22 categories. We
first follow Manova and Zhang (2009) to group these ownerships into four categories:
state owned, private owned, joint venture, and foreign owned. However, there are
very few joint venture and foreign owned firms (less than 10%). Then we re-group
all firms into state owned enterprizes (SOE) and non-state owned enterprizes (non-
SOE).
We also clean the raw data to reduce measurement errors.3 Finally, this yields
an unbalanced panel data of 770 firms over 10 years, and 2601 observations. It
covers approximately 95% revenue in the Chinese steel industry each year. Table
2.2 shows statistics of some key variables.4
1The revenue and the cost are deflated by the production price index; the fixed asset is deflated
by the industry fixed asset price index. The workers’ wage is deflated by the consumption price
index (CPI). The input price, which is nominated by U.S. dollars, is converted by the nominal
exchange rate and deflated by the Chinese CPI (a proxy for the GDP deflator).
2Such classification is based on the principle business so that there is no overlapping that one
firm is coded with two different SICs
3Observations with negative revenue, negative long-run investment, negative total fixed asset,
or negative number of workers are dropped. Further, we drop firms that only appear one year in
the database. There are 428 firms only show up one year over the ten-year period
4It is necessary to clarify the definition of some variables. Here we use total output value as
a proxy for revenue. The total revenue is the main variable to examine the market structure and
market shares are based on total revenue. The profit is measured as the total pre tax profit (i.e.
net profit) plus value added tax (VAT). We use the annual average total fixed net asset (TFA) as a
proxy for capital, which comes from averaging the monthly values of the fixed asset. The number
of workers is also from the monthly average numbers
6
Year Number of Revenue Capital Profit Workers
Firms mean std mean std mean std mean std
1998 177 829.61 2220.70 714.82 2742.48 12.56 61.63 6383 18259
1999 219 777.77 2115.59 678.77 2734.87 5.15 97.92 5189 15645
2000 209 870.65 2410.61 751.53 2854.97 34.63 118.09 4972 15357
2001 199 1078.86 2746.55 869.96 3486.75 47.42 146.05 4678 14661
2002 198 1255.78 3232.93 838.69 3413.97 63.05 198.52 4310 13770
2003 180 1597.01 4057.93 825.28 3437.17 121.15 399.37 3803 12430
2004 321 818.27 2831.22 293.35 1641.92 50.36 378.08 1423 5728
2005 371 905.87 3025.18 298.42 1520.36 44.48 331.32 1375 5892
2006 358 1099.40 3304.17 391.68 2014.72 57.21 316.43 1514 5962
2007 315 1289.54 3506.03 450.44 2311.23 79.87 442.72 1540 5939
Note: revenue, capital and profit are in million RMB
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics of Chinese Steel Firms: 1998-2007
1.4 Overview of the Chinese Steel Industry
The steel industry has been an important part of the Chinese economy since the
1950s. In 2007, the total value-added in this sector captured 4% of the entire Chinese
GDP.5 It has strong connections with its upstream industries, such as iron ore
mining, coal mining, petroleum and natural gas, and with its downstream industries
as well, such as automobile, shipbuilding, construction, home appliances, etc. As
the Chinese economy is still driven by state-oriented investment in sectors with high
steel demand such as automobile and infrastructures, the Chinese steel industry is
perceived to have an optimistic future.
Following Helpman et al. (2008) and Chaney (2008), we split the market ex-
pansion into two sources: expansions of the intensive margin and of the extensive
margin. The intensive margin represents incumbents increasing their capacity and
output, and the extensive margin captures new entrants’ output. Figure 1.1 de-
composes the market expansion by the intensive margin and the extensive margin.
We can see that the intensive margin dominates the market expansion in the Chi-
nese steel industry. This is because the new entrants are most small and medium
5CSB year book, 2008
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enterprizes (SMEs).
Figure 1.1: Intensive Margin vs. Extensive Margin
With the rapid growth, the Chinese steel industry is highly import dependent on
the primary input, iron ore. More than 70% of iron ore demand in China depends on
imports, mainly from Australia, Brazil and India. Their shares in the total imports
were 41%, 23% and 21%. In 2008, China consumed (1,268 mmt) more than 50% of
the world iron ore supply (2,197 mmt) and consumed (434.7 mmt) more than one
third of the world steel output (1201.9 mmt).
Although China is the biggest iron ore consumer in the world, the Chinese steel
industry does not appear to have enough bargaining power to limit price increases.
In 2005, the Chinese steel industry started the iron ore importing price negotiation
with foreign iron ore companies. Due to the high concentration in the iron ore
market, foreign suppliers control the market price. Table 2.1 shows the results of
recent agreements between the steel industry and foreign iron ore suppliers. The
huge increase in input prices has limited the profitability of Chinese steel makers.
For example, in 2010, China imported 618 mmt of iron ore, with the price in-
creasing by 30% ($48.51) per ton. As a result, Chinese steel firms had to pay $30.01
billion more. However, in 2010, the total profit by Chinese steel makers was only
$13.6 billion under the average exchange rate (1:6.6). In 2010, the average profit
8
Price Increasing
Time of the Agreement Buyer Seller Fine Ore Lump Ore
2008.1 BaoSteel Tinto 79.88% 96.50%
2007.3 NSC,Pohang CVRD 65% 71%
2006.12 Baosteel CVRD 9.50% 9.50%
2006.6 BaoSteel BHP 19% 19%
2005.2 NSC Tinto 71.50% 71.50%
Source: Chinese Steel Statistics
Table 1.2: Negotiation on Iron Ore Prices
rate in the Chinese steel industry was only 3.5%, lower than the 6% average for all
Chinese manufacturing industries, and also lower than 10% profitability level in the
world steel industry. On the other hand, upstream iron ore suppliers maintain a
high profitability. BHP Billiton’s net profit increased by 116.5% to $127.2 billion in
2010, and CVRD’s operation profit also increased by 69.2% at the third quarter of
2010.
Figure 1.2 illustrates the upward trends of return to asset ratios (RAR) by three
iron ore suppliers. We can see that after 2002, all the three suppliers’ RARs are
above 30%. This is in sharp contrast to the Chinese steel industry. As the Chinese
Steel Association pointed out, in recent years the profitability of the Chinese steel
industry (around 3%) is the lowest among the entire manufacturing industry (around
6%), and is well below the world average level in the steel industry (around 10%).
It is necessary to introduce the background of the iron ore importing price ne-
gotiation between the Chinese steel industry and foreign suppliers. Baosteel, the
biggest Chinese steel maker, represents the entire industry to negotiate with foreign
suppliers (BHP Billiton, Tinto, and CVRD). Other small and medium firms (SMEs)
cannot bargain with foreign suppliers. Additionally, the Chinese government regu-
lates the iron ore imports. Only 72 firms out of more than 300 firms are “qualified”
to import iron ore. Also, all iron ore trading in China is processed through spot
markets. Any future market or speculation behavior for steel or iron ore is not
9
Source: Financial Statements from Rio Tinto, CVRD, BHP Billiton
Figure 1.2: Iron Ore Companies Profitability (RAR): 1998–2007
allowed. All of these are disadvantages for small steel firms.
In spite of these limitations, from 1998 to 2007, the number of firms in the
Chinese steel industry increased by 90%. SOEs gradually exited as the whole market
expanded. Over 80% of firms in 1998 were SOEs, but this ratio fell below 40% in
2007. On the other hand, there was a rapid expansion within non-SOEs. Non-SOEs
took 15% of firms at 1998, but increased to more than 50% in 2007. These facts can
be well illustrated in figure 1.3. First, many non-SOEs entered the market so that
there were fewer SOEs at the end of the sample period. Second, expansion of the
market output was mainly due to the growth of established big SOEs. Third, SOEs
did not have significant higher profitability than non-SOEs, but the better performed
ones were mainly SOEs. Fourth, the whole market became less concentrated but
within SOEs, the market concentration slightly increased6.
These facts imply that better performing SOEs dominate the market. They have
large market share both in revenue and in profit. During the sample period, the
Chinese steel industry gradually concentrated to these big SOEs, but private firms’
entry has increased market competitiveness.
6The calculated Herfindahl Hirschman Index of the entire market drops from 25.3% in 1998 to
5.0% in 2007; and that is from 5.6% to 5.7% for state owned firms, and from 5.2% to 3.1% for
non-state owned firms.
10
Figure 1.3: Market Structure by Ownership, 1998-2007
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1.5 Market Structure: Regional Fragmentation
The Chinese steel industry has a very low market concentration and may be the
most fragmented of such markets in the world. The top-3 firms’ total market share
is around 15%, far below that of other established producers. Figure 1.4 compares
the top-3 firms’ total market shares in different countries in 2006. The No.1 steel
firm in Korea, Pohang, took 66% of the market. In Japan, the largest steel firm,
Nippon Steel, accounted for 20% of the market. However, for China, the market
shares of top-3 firms were all around 5% in 2006.
Source: Chinese Steel Statistics
Figure 1.4: Chinese Steel Market Concentration
The low market concentration in China results from high level of entry and
regional restrictions. From figure 1.5, we can see that there are three entry peaks in
the Chinese steel industry since 1949. The first one was in 1958 during the “Great
Leap Forward.” At that time, many SOEs were established under the government
plans. The second entry peak was in 1993. Former president Deng Xiaoping took
a trip to southern China in 1992 to push the economic reform forward. The second
entry peak was still driven by SOEs, yet many private firms entered the market as
well. The last entry peak happened in 2003. China joined the WTO in 2001 and
there was an overheating in the Chinese economy in late 2003. Between 2003 and
12
2004, many non-SOEs were established, and most of them were SMEs.
Figure 1.5: Chinese Steel Firms’ Entry: 1950–2006
1.5.1 Geographic Distribution
The boom of SMEs’ entry is due in part to the huge demand from the end-markets
and to the lax environmental standards in China. By 2008, there were over 300 steel
firms in China. This number is far larger than most countries, even accounting for
China’s size. The geographic distribution of Chinese steel firms is very disperse and
from figure 1.6, we can see that almost every province has several steel makers. It
directly results in a low market concentration and a highly fragmented industry.
One possible explanation for the market fragmentation lies in the government
industrial policies. Before the 1980s, the Chinese steel industry was dominated
by SOEs. They were established near iron ore mines or large cities according to
industrial plans, such as AnSteel, PanSteel, and WuSteel. During the “Great Leap
Forward,” there were a large number of small steel firms built up. At that time,
steel production in China was administrated by governmental plans. In part, this
also reflected that fact that Chinese iron ore mines are spread over the country so
steel making firms were established around the country.
13
Figure 1.6: Geographic Distribution of Chinese Steel Firms at 2007
Another potential explanation is that large intra-national trade costs drive the
dispersion. Besides the discussion in the introduction, Poncet (2005) reveals a in-
creased trade cost between Chinese provinces from 1992 to 1997. Naughton (2003)
show the potential impact of increases in inter-provincial trade barriers in the 1990s.
The existence of the intra-national trade cost would lead to excessive entry in the
overall market, because there is little substitution between provinces. The increased
local demand for steel calls for more local suppliers.
1.5.2 Spatial Analysis
According to the analysis above, market concentration in the Chinese steel industry
is unusually low. Here, we use spatial analysis to test the role of intra-national trade
costs by measuring the spatial demand spill-overs across provinces.
We collect the aggregated steel outputs on the province level (both in crude
steel and steel, in million metric tons), province GDP in manufacturing industries,
province industry output price indices (PPI), and geographic distances between
province capital cities. Comparing figure 1.7 and figure 1.8, we can see a positive
relationship between the local steel production and the local GDP, i.e. more devel-
14
oped areas correspond to areas of higher steel output. The correlation coefficient
between local GDP and local steel output is averagely 51% over the sample period.
Figure 1.7: Geographic Distribution of Manufacturing GDP at 2007: 100 million RMB
Figure 1.8: Geographic Distribution of Steel Output at 2007: million metric tons
Steel is the basic raw material for many manufacturing sectors, such as automo-
bile, ship building and machinery. Growth and development in these downstream
markets call for huge amounts of steel. As the Chinese steel association pointed out,
the rapid expansion of the Chinese steel industry is mainly driven by the demand
from the economic growth in China. Therefore, we seek to investigate the impact
15
of manufacturing output on steel production in China.
In order to measure the neighboring spill-over effect on local steel production,
spatial analysis is adopted here. We test whether the local steel production depends
on other provinces’ demand. First, a linear regression equation can be specified as:
lnYit = β0 + β1 lnGDPit + β2 lnPPIit + it (1.1)
Here Yit is the total output of steel in province i at year t. GDPit denotes
the locally real industrial GDP, PPIit is the manufacturing industry output price
indices. Here, we want to test the cross-province dependence of steel production
on GDP. If there is a pattern of substitution across provinces, then the local steel
production would not only depend on local demand but also on other provinces’
demand. That is, other provinces’ demand has spatial effects. Therefore, the above
regression would yield a biased result.
Variables units mean sd min max
Output 104 tons 2005.224 2663.763 1.08 20882.94
Market share % 3.45% 3.68% 0.00% 19.84%
GDP 100 million RMB 2583.652 2816.266 46.15 15939.1
PPI % 103.4479 4.844971 93.7 129.4
Distance kilometer 1280.786 677.0099 103.6108 3463.171
Table 1.3: Province Data Statistics: 2000-2007
Spatial econometrics is a growing field, and recent research has extended spatial
methods to panel data frameworks. Baltagi and Li (2001) use spatial analysis on a
panel data to estimate the demand for liquor in U.S. They get the best 1-year ahead
forecasting if the spatial correlation and state heterogeneity are both controlled.
Cattaneo et al. (2011) adopt a fixed effect spatial lag model to describe the provincial
coal demand in China. They find that the fixed effect spatial lag model fits the
existing data better. Furthermore, Girardin and Kholodilin (2009) introduce the
spatial analysis into a dynamic panel data model to forecast the growth rates of gross
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regional product of Chinese provinces. Their forecasts become much better after
accounting for spatial effects. In macroeconomics area, Steiner (2010) adopts an
instrumental variables approach to study the contagion in capital account policies,
and finds these policies are correlated contemporaneously across countries. Since the
time length here is not as long as in Girardin and Kholodilin (2009) (1979-2007),
we employ the fixed effect spatial lag model as in Cattaneo et al. (2011).
As suggest by Elhorst (2010), the fixed effect spatial lag model is appropriate to
address the spatial correlation. The specification is that other provinces’ outputs
(LHS variables) also enter the linear equation with a weighting matrix. Then the
original model becomes a spatial Durbin model with time and region fixed effect.
yit = β0 + ρ
∑
j 6=i
wijyjt + Xitβ + θ
∑
j 6=i
wijXjt + αi + µt + it (1.2)
In equation 1.2, the dependent variable, yit, is the logarithm of the regional
steel output (mmt) for province i at year t (i = 1, ...N, t = 1, ..., T ). The variable∑
j 6=iwijyjt is the weighted steel output in other provinces (yjt is the logarithm of the
regional steel output for other provinces). Here wij is the i, j-th element in a N ×N
spatial weighting matrix which is derived from the geographic distance between each
two province capital cities. ρ can be used to measure the spatial lag effects from
other provinces. β0 is a constant term. Xit is a vector of two exogenous variables:
industrial GDP and production price index (PPI) in province i at time t, and both
are in logarithm form. Similarly,
∑
j 6=iwijXjt contains the regional industrial GDP
and production price index in other provinces, also in natural logarithm, which can
be used to measure the“spill-over” effects.
Moreover, we also introduce a spatial fixed effect αi and a time fixed effect µt
to control unobserved heterogeneity. The spatial fixed effects capture unobserved
province-specific while time invariant variables, and the time fixed effects control
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for the time-specific effect such as national wide unobservable variable.
If there exist cross-province “spill-over” effects, then the classical panel data
estimation would give us an inconsistent result. We estimate the spatial model using
maximum likelihood suggested by Elhorst (2010), and the results are shown in table
1.4. We also list estimation results with/without controlling for the unobserved
heterogeneity.
Further, we calculate the direct and indirect effects of independent variables as
in ?, where the direct effect measures the effects of local GDP and PPI on local steel
production (i.e. ∂Yit/∂Xit), and the indirect effect measures the effects of GDP and
PPI from other provinces on local steel production (i.e. ∂Yit/∂Xjt). These results
are shown in the lower panel of table 1.4. Comparing the results in different model
specifications, we find local industrial GDP always exerts a significant positive effect
on local steel output. However, the indirect effect of GDP is not significant after
controlling for the spatial fixed effect. It means the local steel production in China
is not affected by the demand from other provinces.
On the other hand, both the direct and indirect effects of the PPI is insignificant
under any model setting which means the steel output is not sensitive to the price
level.
The estimation results suggest that only the local GDP matters. A 10% increases
in local GDP will increase the local steel output by more than 8%, which is equal
to 1.6 mmt on the average. This simple spatial estimation is consistent with my
argument that other provinces’ economic development would not impose a positive
effect on the local steel production.
These results are consistent with the story in which a fragmented market could
severely reduce the bargaining power of the whole industry. Although the Chinese
steel industry is huge, it is segmented into many sub-markets in each province.
Therefore, the Chinese steel industry cannot exert its bargaining power as its to-
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tal output would suggest. The loss of bargaining power means the foreign iron
ore suppliers strongly control the import price, which reduces Chinese steel firms’
profitability.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we take a close look at the Chinese steel industry. We examine firm
heterogeneity in profitability, productivity, and market structure. We attempt to
explain the low profitability in Chinese steel firms given the huge amount of output
by the entire industry.
We first document a clear trend of structural adjustment in the Chinese steel
industry. Small and poorly performing SOEs exited the market, and many non-
SOEs entered the market. Large SOEs expanded their outputs and improved their
productivity and dominated the market. Second, by comparing with steel industries
in other countries, we find the market concentration in the Chinese steel industry is
extremely low.
Then, we use a spatial panel data analysis approach to study the spill-over effect
of other provinces’ demand on local steel production. We calculate the direct effect
which captures the effect of local demand, and indirect effect which captures the
effect of other provinces’ demand, under different model settings. After controlling
for the spatial fixed effect and time fixed effect, we cannot find any significant indirect
effect from the local industrial GDP, while its direct effect is always significantly
positive. Our result suggest that other provinces’ GDP cannot affect the local
steel production. The market segmentation would come from the local government
protection, and make more steel firms survive in each local market, which is a
possible explanation for the low market concentration in the Chinese steel industry.
Under the background of consolidation in upstream suppliers, understanding the
20
nature of firm heterogeneity in the Chinese steel industry is important because of its
implication for market structure dynamics under the context of the vertical market
linkage. The possibility is raised by our findings. In order to obtain the bargaining
power against upstream suppliers, the downstream market needs to increase the
market concentration by consolidation and crowding out SMEs, especially within
SOEs. A promising area for future research is the market linkage and the interaction
between upstream and downstream firms.
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Chapter 2
Market Structures and Profit
Sharing along the Global Supply
Chains
2.1 Introduction
This paper is motivated by the iron-ore importing price negotiations between the
Chinese steel industry and foreign suppliers. In spite of being the biggest iron ore
buyer in the world, the Chinese steel industry does not appear to have much pricing
power. Table 2.1 shows the increases in imported iron ore prices from 2005 to 2008.
Compared with the high profitability of iron-ore suppliers (averaging above 100% in
terms of return to asset ratio), the Chinese steel firms are far less profitable (around
3% in terms of return to asset ratio).
Recently, both Antra`s and Chor (2012) and Costinot, Vogel, and Wang (2011)
study the specialization patterns along global supply chains, while Koopman, Wang,
and Wei (2012) study the measurement issues of exports when global value chain
is in presence. The profit sharing along global supply chain, however, is under
22
Price Increasing
Time of the Agreement Buyer Seller Fine Ore Lump Ore
2008.1 BaoSteel Tinto 79.88% 96.50%
2007.3 NSC,Pohang CVRD 65% 71%
2006.12 Baosteel CVRD 9.50% 9.50%
2006.6 BaoSteel BHP 19% 19%
2005.2 NSC Tinto 71.50% 71.50%
Source: Chinese Steel Statistics
Table 2.1: Negotiation on Iron Ore Prices
investigated. As we can see in the above, the profitability along the supply chain
may vary from 100% in the upstream industry to 3% in the downstream industry.
What may explain these huge differences in profitability?
In this paper we develop a model to study how profits are shared between inter-
mediate input suppliers and final good producers. Differences in market structures
are shown to be main driving forces in profitability differences along the global
supply chain. Applying Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)’s framework of heterogeneous
firms into the problem, we model the downstream (final good) market as the monop-
olistic competition, while the upstream (intermediate input) market in oligopolistic
(Cournot) competition. We show how increases in the entry cost in the upstream
market and segmentations in the final good market increases (decreases) the mar-
ket power of intermediate input (final good) producers, which increase (decrease)
the profitability of intermediate input (final good) producers. We also show how
increases in the demand of the final good affect the price of the intermediate in-
put, which determines the profit sharing between intermediate input and final good
producers. Using firm level data from the Chinese steel industry, we calibrate the
model. Our results show a 20% increase in the final good demand would induce
25% increase in the input price. Our results also suggest the regional trade costs in
the Chinese steel market are about three times as firm’s average marginal cost, and
a 10% decrease in regional trade costs would lower the input prices by 22%.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 models a market vertical
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linkage and derives its equilibrium properties; Section 2.3 introduces the data and
calibrates our model and simulates the “integrated” scenario. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Market Vertical Linkage
We consider an open economy with a (domestic) downstream market and an (for-
eign) upstream market. A homogeneous intermediate good is produced by heteroge-
nous upstream firms. Heterogenous downstream firms, using this intermediate good
as an input, produce differentiated final products. We allow for free entry in both
markets. The downstream market is not perfectly integrated. because of regional
trade barriers. Firms can produce in one region and sell in other regions, and we
model this as a game with two stages: in the first stage, potential entrants in the
upstream market observe an identical entry cost, and they obtain their productiv-
ity levels.1 Then they make entry decisions. After entering the upstream market,
upstream firms engage into a Cournot competition. A market price level comes
out as a result. In the second stage, firms enter the downstream market in a sim-
ilar way, while at the same time post-entry firms have to decide whether they sell
products in other regions or not, considering regional trade barriers. Finally, the
post-entry downstream firms engage into differentiated product competitions within
each region and realize profits.
2.2.1 Downstream Market
The two-stage game requires backward induction to solve. We first look at the
downstream market taking as given the upstream market outcomes. Then we go
back to the upstream market and find the general equilibrium.
1All firms have the information of productivity distributions in two markets.
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Demand Function
The downstream market is segmented into M regions, with each region characterized
by monopolistic competition. Let’s focus on a representative region l, (l = 1, ...,M).
Suppose there is a continuum of differentiated products in region l plus a homoge-
nous product as numeraire. In each region, consumers have an identical quadratic
utility function as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008):
U = q0 + α
∫
i
qsi di−
γ
2
∫
i
(qsi )
2di− η
2
(∫
i
qsi di
)2
(2.1)
Varieties are indexed by i. qsi stands for the consumers’ expenditure share (in
all the varieties) on firm i’s product. q0 indicates the expenditure share of the nu-
meraire good with its price equal to one. Parameters in the demand function, α,
η and γ, are all positive. α and η measure the substitution between varieties and
the numeraire: e.g. higher α means higher marginal utility than the numeraire, and
consumers would like to reduce their consumption on the numeraire. γ measures
the substitution pattern among different varieties. When γ = 0, all the varieties be-
come perfect substitutes, while higher γ means these varieties are less substitutable.
Supposing consumers have a positive demand for the numeraire, the utility function
above yields a linear inverse demand for each variety in region l:
pi = α− γqsi − ηQd (2.2)
Here, pi is the price chosen by firm i in region l, and Qd is the regional market
aggregated output level of all the varieties. We use Nl to measure the mass of sellers
in region l, and Il measures the regional economic size, then the individual demand
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function of a variety i is:
qi = Ilq
s
i =
αIl
ηNl + γ
− Il
γ
pi +
ηNlIl
(ηNl + γ)γ
p¯l (2.3)
Here, p¯l is the regional market average price except the numeraire, p¯l =
∫
i
pidi/Nl.
We can see that there is a positive relationship between a single firm’s output and
market average price. It is straightforward to see that more firms selling in region
l would shrink each firm’s market capacity ( αIl
ηNl+γ
). The maximum individual price
level leads to zero output:
plmax =
γα + ηNlp¯l
ηNl + γ
(2.4)
This equation means that higher market capacity (bigger α) would result in,
ceteris paribus, a higher maximum price. As a result, the price elasticity of demand
is given as a function of pmax:
ei =
pi
pmax − pi (2.5)
Therefore, the price elasticity of demand is endogenous in this model which is dif-
ferent from Melitz (2003).
2.2.2 Production and Multilateral Trade in the Downstream
Market
Firm heterogeneity is reflected in their productivity. Suppose each firm’s marginal
cost is constant but different from each other. Firms’ productivity determines their
marginal cost. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) only focus on firms’ marginal cost
without specifying a production function. Since we need to connect the upstream
market and the downstream market, a production function is necessary. Suppose in
each region, each downstream firm uses the upstream output as the only input to
produce final goods. As in the firm heterogeneity literature (See Chaney (2008)),
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the production function is constant-return-to-scale and follows:
qi =
xi
ϕi
(2.6)
Here xi is the input (intermediate product) used by a downstream firm i, and ϕi
is the inverse productivity level of firm i. It means that one unit of output in firm i
calls for ϕi units of the intermediate good, thus higher ϕi implies lower productivity.
As a result, the marginal production cost in firm i is:
ci = Puϕi (2.7)
Here Pu is the upstream market price level. Since the upstream output is ho-
mogeneous and upstream firms engage in a Cournot competition, downstream firms
just follow the upstream market price, Pu.
The downstream market is not perfectly integrated. Recall that there are M re-
gions, indexed by l, (l = 1, 2, ...M). A representative firm in region l makes decisions
on domestic price plD and export price to region h, p
lh
X , (h 6= l)). Firms maximize
their domestic and exporting profits independently. Since the downstream market
is similar to a multilateral economy, firms are facing M − 1 exporting markets. The
two profit functions of a representative firm in region l can be written as:
pilD(ϕ) = (p
l
D(ϕ)− Puϕ)qlD(ϕ) (2.8)
pilhX (ϕ) = (p
lh
X(ϕ)− τlhPuϕ)qlhX (ϕ)
Each downstream firm i in region l will choose its optimal prices, plD and p
lh
X , ac-
cording to its productivity level 1/ϕi. This means prices are functions of their pro-
ductivity. Following Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), firms sell products where they
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can make non-negative profit. This results in the cut-off productivity in region l:
ϕ∗l =
plmax
Pu
ϕ∗lh =
phmax
Puτlh
(2.9)
Here, plmax yields zero selling in region l. That is:
plmax =
αγ + ηNlp¯l
ηNl + γ
(2.10)
Nl is the number of sellers in region l. p¯l is the average price level in region l.
Following Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), a representative firm with productivity level
ϕ in region l of the downstream market has its optimal outputs qld, q
lh
x and profits
pild, pi
lh
x .
qld(ϕ) =
PuIl
2γ
(ϕ∗l − ϕ) qlhx (ϕ) =
PuIh
2γ
(ϕ∗h − τlhϕ)
pld(ϕ) =
Pu
2
(ϕ∗l + ϕ) p
lh
x (ϕ) =
Pu
2
(ϕ∗h + τlhϕ)
pild(ϕ) =
P 2uIl
4γ
(ϕ∗l − ϕ)2 pilhx (ϕ) =
P 2uIh
4γ
(ϕ∗h − τlhϕ)2
Here, ϕ∗l is the local cut-off productivity level of the fringe firms at region l.
All the firms with ϕi < ϕ
∗
l will sell their products in the local market. On the
other hand, firms with ϕi < ϕ
∗
h/τlh will export from region l to region h. Here, τlh
measures the intra-national transportation cost (freeness of trade) between region l
and region h and τlh ≥ 1 for all l, h ∈M and τll = 1.
We can see that more productive firms tend to export to other regions, and they
produce more output, making more profit.
The mark-up i in a market (domestic or exporting) is endogenous here which is
a key difference from a monopolistic competition model with CES demand function.
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The firm i’s mark-up i is determined by its productivity:
i =
(ϕ∗ − ϕ)2
(ϕ∗2 − ϕ2) (2.11)
2.2.3 Entry and Distribution in the Downstream Market
In the downstream market, each firm faces a domestic market and M − 1 exporting
markets. Suppose there is a fixed cost for a firm to establish in the downstream
market, fd. This fixed cost is identical in each region. The free entry condition
for a domestic firm in region l is that the expected post-entry total profit over the
domestic market and all the exporting market is equal to the fixed entry cost2.
∫ ϕ∗l
0
pild(ϕ)dG(ϕ) +
M∑
h6=l
∫ ϕ∗h/τlh
0
pilhx (ϕ)dG(ϕ) = fd (2.12)
Each firm draws its inverse productivity from the distribution G(ϕ).3 Follow Yeaple,
Helpman, and Melitz (2004) and Chaney (2008), we specify the distribution of
productivity 1/ϕ following a Pareto distribution with a shape parameter k and the
lowest level 1/ϕm. The Pareto distribution is an appropriate approximation for
firms’ productivity. Del Gatto, Mion, and Ottaviano (2006) empirically show that
this Pareto distribution fits well for firms’ productivity in many countries.
The Pareto distribution of 1/ϕ means ϕ has distribution:
G(ϕ) =
(
ϕ
ϕm
)k
ϕ ∈ [0, ϕm]
Recall that ϕ measures firms’ marginal costs. G(ϕ) reveals the draw of firms’ cost.
Thus, the shape parameter k captures the dispersion of firms’ productivity. When
k = 1, the distribution of ϕ degenerates to a uniform distribution. Higher k indicates
2We misuse the “entry” as establishing.
3Recall that higher ϕ means lower productivity.
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a thinner right tail and more firms concentrated in the low productivity part; when
k goes to infinite, the productivity distribution shrinks to 1/ϕm.
A good property of the inverse Pareto distribution above is that a truncated
conditional distribution has the same shape parameters. Similar to Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008), equation 2.15 can be reduced to:
M∑
h=1
ρlhIh(ϕ
∗
h)
k+2 =
2γ(k + 1)(k + 2)(ϕm)
kfe
P 2u
l = 1, ...,M (2.13)
There are M linear equations, and we can solve for the cut-off productivity levels
ϕ∗l , l = 1, ...,M by Cramer’s rule.
ϕ∗l =
(
2(k + 1)(k + 2)feγ
|P |λ
∑M
h=1 |Chl|
Il
) 1
k+2
/Pu (2.14)
Here, PM×M is the matrix with its element Plh = ρlh = (τlh)−k, and |Chl| is ρhl’s
cofactor. λ = (Puϕm)
−k results from the lower bound of marginal cost which is
assumed to be exogenous.
In order to check the segmented market’s effect, let’s assume the intra national-
trade cost τlh is proportional to the geographic distance: τlh = θdlh. Then the
expression of the cut-off productivity ϕ∗l becomes:
ϕ∗l = θ
k
k+2
(
2(k + 1)(k + 2)feγ
|P˜ |λ
∑M
h=1 |C˜hl|
Il
) 1
k+2
/Pu (2.15)
So, we can see that a less integrated market would lower down the cut-off produc-
tivity level (higher ϕ∗), which means more less productive firms enter the market.
∂ϕ∗l
∂θ
> 0 (2.16)
Thus, from the discussion above, the average price level and the mass of sellers
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in region l are given by:
p¯l =
2k + 1
2k + 2
Puϕ
∗
l Nl =
2(k + 1)γ
η
α− Puϕ∗l
Puϕ∗l
(2.17)
Note sellers in region l come from M regions (include region l itself). Therefore,
Nl = G(ϕ
∗
l )N
l
e +
∑
h6=l
G(ϕ∗lh)N
lh
x (2.18)
Here, N le is the mass of entrants in region l. Among N
l
e firms, G(ϕ
∗
l )N
l
e firms
can survive and sell products in region l, and among these G(ϕ∗l )N
l
e firms, there are
G(ϕ∗lh)N
l
e firms exporting from region l to region h. Since we can let the domestic
transportation cost τll = 1, the equation above gives M equations:
M∑
h=1
ρhlλN
h
e =
Nl
P ku (ϕ
∗
l )
k
l = 1, ...,M (2.19)
Solving these M equations, we can get the number of entrant in region l, N le.
N le =
2(k + 1)γ
η|P |λ
M∑
h=1
(α− Puϕ∗h)|Clh|
(Puϕ∗h)k+1
(2.20)
As in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), there are N ld firms selling in region l and N
lh
x
exporting from region l to region h.
N ld = N
l
eG(ϕ
∗
l ) = N
l
e
(
ϕ∗l
ϕm
)k
(2.21)
N lhx = N
l
eG(ϕ
∗
lh) = N
l
e
(
ϕ∗h
τlhϕm
)k
(2.22)
Then the effect of θ here is:
∂N ld
∂θ
> 0
∂N lhx
∂θ
< 0 (2.23)
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These implies that in a less integrated economy, there will be more firms survive
in local markets. So far, we solve for the number of producers and exporters, as
well as their geographic distribution in the segmented downstream market. Then,
the regional output in the downstream market can be derived by integrating all the
survivors in region l.
Qld = N
l
e
∫ ϕ∗l
0
PuIl
2γ
(ϕ∗l − ϕ)dG(ϕ) (2.24)
Qlhx = N
l
e
∫ ϕ∗lh
0
PuIh
2γ
(ϕ∗lh − τlhϕ)dG(ϕ) (2.25)
These two equations then become:
Qld =
1
2γ(k + 1)ϕkm
PuIlϕ
∗k+1
l N
l
e (2.26)
Qlhx =
1
2γ(k + 1)ϕkmτ
k
lh
PuIhϕ
∗k+1
h N
l
e (2.27)
Furthermore, we can aggregate the regional revenue through the similar way.
Rld =
1
2γ(k + 2)ϕkm
P 2uIlϕ
∗k+2
l N
l
e (2.28)
Rlhx =
1
2γ(k + 2)ϕkmτ
k
lh
P 2uIhϕ
∗k+2
h N
l
e (2.29)
Therefore, we get the market supply in domestic markets and (inter-regional) ex-
porting markets. Next, we can solve the demand for the intermediate good in the
upstream.
2.2.4 Demand in Upstream
The vertical linkage is that the upstream total output is the total input in the
downstream. It gives the identification condition to connect two markets. Given
the production function by downstream firms, one single firm’s demand for the
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intermediate good in one market is:
xi = ϕiqi =
PuI
2γ
ϕi(ϕ
∗ − ϕi) (2.30)
Here, ϕ∗ is the inverse cut-off productivity level in either a domestic market or
an exporting market. We can see that given the same output qi, larger ϕi indicates
higher demand for the intermediate product.
The total demand for the intermediate good from region l has two parts: those
for the domestic selling and those for the exporting selling (given the upstream
market price Pu):
X ld = N
l
e
∫ ϕ∗l
0
PuIl
2γ
ϕ(ϕ∗l − ϕ)dG(ϕ) (2.31)
X lhx = N
l
e
∫ ϕ∗lh
0
PuIh
2γ
ϕ(ϕ∗lh − τlhϕ)dG(ϕ) (2.32)
We can get the expressions for the intermediate input demand:
X ld =
k
2γ(k + 1)(k + 2)ϕkm
IlN
l
ePuϕ
∗k+2
l (2.33)
X lhx =
k
2γ(k + 1)(k + 2)ϕkmτ
k+1
lh
IhN
l
ePuϕ
∗k+2
h (2.34)
Since downstream firms face a flat price Pu, we can get the expenditure for the
intermediate good.
Eld =
k
2γ(k + 1)(k + 2)ϕkm
IlN
l
eP
2
uϕ
∗k+2
l (2.35)
Elhx =
k
2γ(k + 1)(k + 2)ϕkmτ
k+1
lh
IhN
l
eP
2
uϕ
∗k+2
h (2.36)
The total upstream output can be derived by summing up market demand over
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all the downstream regions.
Qu =
M∑
l=1
(X ld +
M∑
h6=l
X lhx ) (2.37)
Here, Qu is the total demand for the upstream output. Similarly, we can get the
total expenditure by all downstream firms on intermediate goods.
Eu =
M∑
l=1
(Eld +
M∑
h6=l
Elhx ) (2.38)
By plugging in all the expressions derived above, we can get the inverse demand
function in the upstream market.
Qu = Λ/Pu
where
Λ =
∑
l
∑
h
(
1
τ k+1lh
k
k + 2
∑M
j=1 |Clj|
η|P | A0
(
M∑
i=1
(α− A0Ai) |Chi|
Ak+1i
))
and
A0 =
(
2(k + 1)(k + 2)feγ
|P |λ
) 1
k+2
Ai =
(
M∑
h=1
|Chi|/Ii
) 1
k+2
The final expression for Qu shows us a downward slopping demand curve in
the upstream market, and Λ captures the expenditure by downstream firms, i.e.
Λ = Eu.
Therefore, the demand curve is reduced to Pu = Λ/Qu. We can see Λ is deter-
mined by the downstream market, and the demand curve has a unit price elasticity.
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Furthermore, we can also check the effect of the intra-national trade barrier θ. Note
θ enters matrices P and Cij, we get
∂Pu
∂θ
> 0 (2.39)
Here, Λ is the demand curve shifter, and larger Λ results in a higher price in
the upstream market (larger Pu). This means in a less integrated market, there
will be more demand for the intermediate good by downstream firms. So far, we
solve the equilibrium in the downstream market. We can see that the price of the
intermediate good is important here. We move the upstream market and solve for
Pu.
2.2.5 Profitability in the Downstream Market
In the previous sections, we derive the mark-ups for downstream firms.
i =
(ϕ∗ − ϕ)2
(ϕ∗2 − ϕ2)
This means that profitability is endogenous in the downstream market, which is
different from Melitz (2003). Then we can see that:
∂
∂ϕ
< 0
This means a low level cut-off productivity (high ϕ∗) results in a low productivity
(low ¯), given the market cut-off productivity level φ∗
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2.2.6 Cournot Competition in Upstream
The upstream market competition is featured by a Cournot game, i.e. perfect sub-
stitutes and quantity competition4. Here, we consider an oligopolistic upstream
market which is fully integrated. Suppose there are N firms in the upstream mar-
ket, and firm heterogeneity is also reflected in their productivity φ. For simplicity
we assume upstream firms only use labor as producing factor and their production
functions are constant-return-to-scale which implies a unit wage rate.
Let firms’ productivity directly measures firms’ marginal cost, i.e. φj = cj. An
individual upstream firm’s profit function is:
piju = (Pu − φj)qj =
(
Λ∑
j qj
− φj
)
qj (2.40)
Here, similar to the downstream analysis, the inverse of φj measures firms’ pro-
ductivity. Higher φ requires more labor. Due to the perfect substitute among
outputs, the market output level Qu is the sum of all firms’ outputs. The first order
condition gives the optimal output level: qj =
ΛQu−Q2uφj
Λ
. Then the upstream market
output and price can be derived accordingly.
Qu =
(N − 1)Λ
Nφ¯u
(2.41)
Pu =
N
N − 1 φ¯u (2.42)
Here, the inverse of φ¯u is the average marginal cost level in the upstream market.
We can see that the market price Pu is determined by the average cost and numbers
of firms. Less firms and higher marginal costs lead to higher market price.
4Intermediate products are generally homogeneous, such as cotton, iron ore, crude oil etc. Many
intermediate products are global commodities which follow global price levels and can be traded
quickly around the world through spot and/or future markets. Although speculation does exist in
many intermediate products market, their market prices are determined by fundamental supply
and demand.
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After deriving the market price and output, an individual upstream firm’s opti-
mal output and profit can also be derived.
qj =
Λ
P 2u
(Pu − φ) (2.43)
pij =
Λ
P 2u
(Pu − φ)2 (2.44)
These results confirm that: less firms result in less output in each firm; more produc-
tive firms (lower marginal cost) produce more and make more profit. Particularly,
an upstream firm’s mark-up can be written as:
=
Pu − φj
Pu
=
qj
Qu
That is, firms’ profitability is determined by their market shares. Thus, in a
highly concentrated market, firms may obtain a high level of profitability.
2.2.7 Equilibrium in Upstream
Now it is necessary to identify the cut-off cost level in the upstream φ∗u. A similar
free entry condition of the upstream entrants is to break even the post entry net
profit: ∫ φ∗u
0
pi(φ)dG(φ) = fu (2.45)
Furthermore, we also specify a zero profit condition as in Melitz (2003):
pi(φ∗) =
Λ
P 2u
(Pu − φ∗)2 = 0 (2.46)
Here, we also assume upstream firms’ productivity comes from similar distribu-
tion as downstream firms, i.e. Pareto distribution with shape parameter ku. The
zero profit condition shows that: N = ku + 1. In a less heterogenous market, we
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would expect a smaller k associated with smaller N .
Then, the free entry condition can identify the cut-off productivity level which
determine the price of the intermediate good, Pu.
kΛ
φkmP
2
u
(
1
k
P 2uφ
∗k − 2
k + 1
Puφ
∗k+1 +
1
k + 2
φ∗k+2
)
= fu (2.47)
Since 1/φj also follow a Pareto distribution, we have φ¯ =
k
k + 1
φ∗. Recall that
Pu = φ¯u, we have a equation to determine Pu
Pu =
(
(ku + 1)(ku + 2)fu
2Λ
) 1
ku
φm (2.48)
2.3 Calibration
How large is the inter-regional trade cost? What is its effect on downstream firms’
profitability and upstream firms’ pricing? These questions can be addressed through
the model calibration. We process two stages in following parts. First, we estimate
structural parameters to calibrate the model. Then we investigate this calibrated
model to test the effect of market integration in the downstream market.
In the calibration stage, we first construct firm level productivity in the down-
stream market, using the firm level data from the Chinese steel industry over 2000-
2007. Then we can recover the distribution shape parameter k of the downstream
firms’ productivity. Next, we estimate the inter-regional trade cost, τlh = θdlh via an
aggregated gravity equation 2.52 using the regional output and geographic data. As
a result, we can recover the trade cost matrix P and its associated cofactor matrix
Clh.
In the simulation stage, we perform a counterfactual experiment on the calibrated
model. Particularly, we simulate the change of the upstream market price Pu as
changing the downstream market trade cost. By examining the vertical linkage in
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terms of the input price, it provides a measurement of the “gains from free (inter-
regional) trade”, that is “gains from industrial integration”.
2.3.1 Data
In our empirical study, we use several data sets. First, we analyze a newly released
proprietary firm level data of Chinese manufacturing firms over 2000-2007. This
data is collected and provided by the Chinese Statistics Bureau (CSB) through
annual firm surveys.
The data covers all firms with annual revenue above 5 million Renminbi (RMB).
It also reports the main financial summaries of each firm. All the numbers are booked
in current values. We deflate them into net values with various price indices.5
All firms are coded into four-digit standard industrial classification (SIC). We
narrow the Chinese steel industry to firms with code number 3220 (steel refinery)
to restrict our analysis6. We also clean the raw data to reduce measurement errors.7
Finally, this yields an unbalanced panel data of 770 firms over 10 years, and 2601
observations. It covers approximately 95% revenue in the Chinese steel industry
each year. Table 2.2 shows statistics of some key variables.8
With regards to the regional level information (distance and local GDP), we use
the province data from the CSB. It includes the local GDP (in 100 million RMB
5The revenue and the cost (so that profits) are deflated by the production price index; the
fixed asset is deflated by the industry fixed asset price index. The workers’ wage is deflated by the
consumption price index (CPI). The input price, which is nominated by U.S. dollar, is converted
by the nominal exchange rate and deflated by the Chinese CPI (a proxy for the GDP deflator).
6Such classification is based on firms’ principle business so that there is no overlapping that
one firm is coded with two different SICs
7Observations with negative revenue, negative long-run investment, negative total fixed asset,
or negative number of workers are dropped. Further, I drop firms that only appear one year in the
database. There are 428 firms only show up one year over the ten-year period
8It is necessary to clarify the definition of some variables. We use total output value as a proxy
for revenue. The total revenue is the main variable to examine the market structure and firms’
market shares are based on their total revenue. The profit is measured as the total pre tax profit
(i.e. net profit) plus value added tax (VAT). We use the annual average total fixed net asset (TFA)
as a proxy for capital, which comes from averaging the monthly values of the fixed asset. The
number of workers is also from the monthly average numbers
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Year Number of Revenue Capital Profit Workers
Firms mean std mean std mean std mean std
1998 177 829.61 2220.70 714.82 2742.48 12.56 61.63 6383 18259
1999 219 777.77 2115.59 678.77 2734.87 5.15 97.92 5189 15645
2000 209 870.65 2410.61 751.53 2854.97 34.63 118.09 4972 15357
2001 199 1078.86 2746.55 869.96 3486.75 47.42 146.05 4678 14661
2002 198 1255.78 3232.93 838.69 3413.97 63.05 198.52 4310 13770
2003 180 1597.01 4057.93 825.28 3437.17 121.15 399.37 3803 12430
2004 321 818.27 2831.22 293.35 1641.92 50.36 378.08 1423 5728
2005 371 905.87 3025.18 298.42 1520.36 44.48 331.32 1375 5892
2006 358 1099.40 3304.17 391.68 2014.72 57.21 316.43 1514 5962
2007 315 1289.54 3506.03 450.44 2311.23 79.87 442.72 1540 5939
Note: revenue, capital and profit are in million RMB
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics of Chinese Steel Firms: 1998-2007
real value), local steel production (in 10 million metric tons), and province distances.
Here, geographic distance between two provinces is measured by geographic distance
between two provincial capital cities (in kilometers).
Variables units mean sd min max
Output 104 tons 2005.224 2663.763 1.08 20882.94
Market share % 3.45% 3.68% 0.00% 19.84%
GDP 100 million RMB 2583.652 2816.266 46.15 15939.1
PPI % 103.4479 4.844971 93.7 129.4
Distance kilometer 1280.786 677.0099 103.6108 3463.171
Table 2.3: Province Data Statistics: 2000-2007
To measure the effect of inter-regional trade cost on downstream firms’ prof-
itability, we focus on the downstream market first and recover some key structural
parameters, particularly those in the equation 2.15. However, since the inter-regional
trade volume data is not available, we estimate an aggregate gravity equation (equa-
tion 2.53) instead.
We use firm level data to construct firm level productivity and estimate its
distribution, then we aggregate firm level data into regional level and match with
the regional data. Therefore, we estimate the inter-regional trade cost through an
aggregated gravity equation from our model. Finally, we simulated our model with
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these structural parameters.
2.3.2 Downstream Firms Productivity
First, we need to estimate the shape parameter (k) of firms’ productivity with an
underlying Pareto distribution. This requires firm level productivity.
There are various ways of productivity estimation. As we discuss in the theo-
retical part, firms’ productivity reflects their ability to transform the intermediate
good into final products. Here we measure productivity using firms added value
divided by total inputs. Using the notation above, downstream firms’ productivity
is determined by:
1/ϕi =
V Ai
INPUTi
(2.49)
This ratio is calculated directly from the production function for downstream
firms. As pointed out by the UBS Investment Bank Research, the cost structure
in the Chinese steel industry is dominated by the raw material (iron ore), therefore
this ratio is appropriate to reflect firms productivity.
2.3.3 Shape Parameter k
Downstream firms’ productivity is assumed to follow a Pareto distribution. The
shape parameter k is very important, since k enters many formulas in our modeling
part.
Del Gatto, Mion, and Ottaviano (2006) suggest an approach to capture the
shape parameter in a Pareto distribution. Since 1/ϕ follows a Pareto distribution,
with its cumulative distribution F (1/ϕ) observable, a regression below can show the
estimator of the shape parameter k.
ln(1− F (1/ϕ)) = α− k lnϕ+  (2.50)
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As Del Gatto, Mion, and Ottaviano (2006) point out, the estimator k in the
regression 2.50 is a consistent estimator for the shape parameter of 1/ϕ, with a
relatively high goodness of fit. The estimation on the Chinese steel firm level data
gives a shape parameter equal to 3.1928. Compare to the results in Del Gatto, Mion,
and Ottaviano (2006), the Chinese steel industry has a larger shape parameter which
implies more firms are less productive.
2.3.4 Regional Trade Barriers
After recovery the shape parameter k, we can then estimate the inter-regional trade
cost. Traditional estimation on trade cost is build up on the gravity equation with
bilateral trade volume data. Since the intra national trade volume data is not
available, we estimate an aggregate gravity model as an alternative.
Qld =
1
2γ(k + 1)ϕkm
PuIlϕ
∗k+1
l N
l
e (2.51)
Qlhx =
1
2γ(k + 1)ϕkmτ
k
lh
PuIhϕ
∗k+1
h N
l
e (2.52)
Then the total regional output is:
Ql = Q
l
d +
∑
h6=l
Qlhx =
1
2γ(k + 1)ϕkm
PuIlϕ
∗k+1
l N
l
e
M∑
h=1
(
Ih
Il
(
ϕ∗h
ϕ∗l
)k+1
/τ klh
)
(2.53)
Recall that ϕl (l = 1, ...,M) is determined by equation 2.15, the ratio ϕh/ϕl is
then determined by Ih/Il. Further, we assume that the trade cost is proportional
to the geographic distance, τlh = θdlh
Then the last part in the aggregate gravity equation becomes:
M∑
h=1
(
Ih
Il
(
ϕ∗h
ϕ∗l
)k+1
/τ klh
)
= 1 + θ−k
∑
h6=l
(∑M
k=1 |C˜kh|∑M
k=1 |C˜kl|
Ih
Il
) 1
k+2
= 1 + θ−kΣ (2.54)
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where
Σ =
∑
h6=l
(∑M
k=1 |C˜kh|∑M
k=1 |C˜kl|
Ih
Il
) 1
k+2
/dklh
On the right hand side of equation 2.53, we are interested in the parameter for
regional trade barriers, θ. Since Pu and N
l
e are endogenous, we use province and
year dummy to control for these endogeneity, as suggested in Del Gatto, Mion, and
Ottaviano (2006). We take logarithm of both side of equation 2.53, and linearize
the equation. Note that Σ is a multiplier of the neighborhood spill-over effect which
shares the same marginal effect of Il. Finally, we estimate a linear model;
lnQit = β0 + β1 ln Iit + β1θ
−kΣit + α1i + µ1t + 1it (2.55)
The estimation shows a significant result that θ = 0.0032, with t−statistics
equal to 4.7636. In China, the average geographic distance between two provinces
is 1326.5km, which implies an average regional trade barrier is: E[τ ] = 4.2507
Recall that τ measures the iceberg trade cost by increasing firms’ marginal pro-
duction cost. Therefore, this value of τ implies that exporting steel to another
province increases firms marginal cost by three time more on average in China. This
is a huge amount of trade cost which results in a segmented downstream market.
Next, we move to the upstream market and simulate market outcome there.
2.3.5 Downstream Market Demand vs. Upstream Market
Price
In our model, the demand for the final good in the downstream market, Il(l =
1, ...,M), is exogenous. We can also calibrate its effects on the upstream market
price. Since Il will determine the total output by downstream firms, which deter-
mines the total expenditure on the intermediate good. We adopt a similar method
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as in the last section to measure the effect of demand for downstream output on the
upstream prices.
Recall that
Λ = Eu =
M∑
l=1
(Eld +
M∑
h6=l
Elhx )
and
X ld =
k
2γ(k + 1)(k + 2)ϕkm
IlN
l
ePuϕ
∗k+2
l (2.56)
X lhx =
k
2γ(k + 1)(k + 2)ϕkmτ
k+1
lh
IhN
l
ePuϕ
∗k+2
h (2.57)
Then we can derive a similar aggregated gravity equation for the total expendi-
ture on the intermediate good.
lnEit = γ0 + γ1 ln Iit + γ1θ
−kΣit + α2i + µ2t + 2it (2.58)
Since we already recover the inter-regional trade cost in the last section, we need
to force θ to keep the same, while controlling for the province and year specific
heterogeneities. The coefficient γ1 captures the effect of Iit on the total expenditure
in region i, Eit. Our results show that γ1 = 1.2713 with p-value 0.083. It implies
a responsive effect transfer the demand for the downstream market product to the
demand for the upstream market product. Furthermore, we can derive change of
upstream prices as a response to the downstream market demand change, since Λ
can be interpreted as a demand shifter in the upstream market.
∂ lnPu
∂ ln Iit
=
∂ lnPu
∂ ln Λ
∂ ln Λ
∂ ln Iit
Thus, our result shows a responsive change in Pu as Iit changing. A 20% increase
in the demand for the final product in the downstream market would result in 25.4%
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increase in the upstream market price.
2.3.6 Regional Trade Cost vs. Upstream Market Price
We are interested in the effect of the inter-regional trade cost, τ or θ, on the upstream
market price, Pu. From the analysis above, the market demand in the upstream
market is given by:
Pu =
Λ
Qu
(2.59)
Here, Λ is determined by the downstream market conditions, and can be inter-
preted as a demand shifter in the upstream. Therefore,
∂ lnPu
ln Λ
> 0
Recall that Λ is determined by
Λ =
∑
l
∑
h
(
1
τ k+1lh
k
k + 2
∑M
j=1 |Clj|
η|P | A0
(
M∑
i=1
(α− A0Ai) |Chi|
Ak+1i
))
(2.60)
Note that θ enters τ , P , |C|, A0 and Ai. We can find that:
∂Λ
∂θ
= (k − 1)θk−2 (2.61)
Then, we can calculate the effect of inter-regional trade costs on upstream market
prices.
∂ lnPu
ln θ
=
∂ lnPu
ln Λ
∂ ln Λ
ln θ
= 2.1928
This result implies an elastic response of upstream market price on downstream
market trade costs. A 10% decrease in the inter-regional trade cost would result in
22% decrease in the upstream market price.
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2.4 Conclusion
The iron ore importing price negotiation calls for a lot of attention in recent years.
As the largest steel maker in the world, the Chinese steel industry yet loss its bargain
power and keeps a very low profitability. We explain this issue by modeling a vertical
market linkage under the open economy context.
Since the downstream market is characterized by segmentation, we adopt a multi-
region model with heterogeneous firms featured by monopolistic competition with
variable mark-ups, in order to capture the segmentation in the downstream mar-
ket. Meanwhile, we use a Cournot competition to model the upstream market.
The model shows that regional trade barriers could result in excessive demand for
intermediate goods and push up the input price.
Then we calibrate our model with firm level data from the Chinese steel industry.
Some structural parameters are recovered. The distribution of firms productivity
is highly skewed compare to other manufacturing sectors in other countries, which
implies a lot of inefficient firms in the Chinese steel industry. Further, we estimate
an aggregated gravity equation of regional steel production. Our results suggest
that inter-regional trade barriers in the Chinese steel industry are as triple as firms’
marginal cost on average.
Finally, we use these structural parameters to calibrate our model. Our result
first reveals a positive relationship between the demand for the downstream market
output and the upstream market price. The effect is responsive that a 20% increase
in the final product demand would induce a 25% increase in the upstream market
price. Furthermore, our calibration shows a negative relationship between the up-
stream market price and the regional trade barriers in the downstream market. A
10% decrease of the inter-regional trade cost would lower down the input price by
22%.
Compared with Table 1, our results provide an possibility for the increase of iron
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ore price in the Chinese steel industry. Considering a 60% increasing of iron ore
prices in recent years, our model offers an decent yet underestimated explanation.
Some further research could focus on how different market structures affects the
bargaining power in supply chains.
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Chapter 3
Investment, Importing and
Productivity Dynamics
3.1 Introduction
In recent decades, the global economy has been characterized by the increasing im-
portance of the intermediate inputs trade, a reflection of increased international
specialization.1 Empirical studies have found a positive relationship between firm
export and import behaviors (See Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007) and Al-
tomonte and Be´ke´s (2008)). This suggests a similar self-selection issue to that of
the export market: more productive firms may be more likely to enter import mar-
kets. Further, importing could also lead to a productivity effect, since importers
can access higher quality and more diverse inputs on the international market. This
study aims to further explore the relationship between firm productivity and access
to import markets.
Researchers have used micro-level data to study firms’ importing behaviors (See
Kugler and Verhoogen (2009) and Vogel and Wagner (2010)). They find that im-
1According to Hummels et al. (2001), around 20% of total exports can be attributed to inter-
mediate goods trading in 1995 which represents 40% growth since 1970.
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porters exhibit many similarities to exporters; for example, larger and more pro-
ductive firms tend to import their inputs. Additionally, empirical research, covering
a range of countries and industries, has documented a positive correlation between
import activities and productivity levels.2 One possibility is that less productive
firms rely less on the import market due to the associated fixed and sunk costs
from involvement (See Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008), Andersson, Lo¨o¨f, and Jo-
hansson (2008), and Castellani, Serti, and Tomasi (2010)). These costs could come
from searching for suitable foreign suppliers, product inspection, the negotiation
and contract process, as well as obtaining permits from governments which can be
severe in developing countries (See Bas and Berthou (2012)).
On the other hand, there is a feedback effect from importing on firms’ produc-
tivity; that is, importing firms enjoy faster productivity growth. People causally
explain the impact of importing on firms’ productivity in several ways. Andersson,
Lo¨o¨f, and Johansson (2008) and Castellani, Serti, and Tomasi (2010) argue that
importing inputs from foreign countries brings in better knowledge and technology.
As a result, the “learning by importing” effect comes from importing firms obtaining
and extracting the advanced technologies embodied in the imported intermediate
goods. Also, imported goods may be of higher qualities, as well as available in more
varieties and specializations, which can improve production efficiency for the final
goods (See Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2006), Altomonte and Be´ke´s (2008), and
Muuˆls and Pisu (2009)).
Under this context, trade liberalization (trade cost elimination) in import mar-
kets has a similar interpretation as that in export markets. Besides the traditional
trade costs (e.g. tariffs, ice-burg costs) as in the export markets, trade costs in the
import markets are also reflected in import qualification, especially for developing
2These include Amiti and Konings (2007) on Indonesia, by Kasahara and Lapham (2008) on
Chile, by Castellani, Serti, and Tomasi (2010) on Italian firms, by Jabbour (2010) on France, and
by Raff and Wagner (2010) on German.
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countries and for some raw materials, such as petroleum and iron ore (See Manova
and Zhang (2009), and Bas and Berthou (2012)). Governments often restrict certain
firms to import intermediate inputs, as is the case for the Chinese steel producers.
Therefore, a reduction of trade costs in these context implies more firms will have
access to foreign suppliers, allowing them to upgrade their inputs and improve pro-
ductivity. Amiti and Konings (2007) use manufacturing data from Indonesia to
show that the trade liberalization in 1990s with inputs tariff reduction is associated
with an increase of firms productivity.
Moreover, the interaction with investment in terms of productivity effects is dif-
ferent from that in the exporting case. Importing directly affect production process
by changing inputs. On the other hand, investment would upgrade machinery and
appliances to accommodate imported (better and more various) inputs, which may
improve productivity as a result. Moreover, investment can also upgrade technology
which can directly raise firms’ productivity. In this regards, importing and investing
activities could be compliments and/or substitutes.3.
In this paper, I develop and estimate a structural model of importing and in-
vestment activities using firm level data from the Chinese steel industry during the
period 2000-2006. The model is used to explore the relationship between import-
ing and investment decisions, and their effects on productivity dynamics. First, I
show that there are both positive effects from investment and from importing on
productivity growth. Firms engaging into both activities can enjoy 3.72% produc-
tivity premium in the long run; second, there are significantly higher entry and fixed
cost in the import market, comparing with these costs associated with investment;
third, these costs create a self-selection issue in import and investment activities,
and after controlling for this issue, more productive firms benefit more from these
two activities; finally, simulation in the import market implies that a 10% reduction
3In firms’s exporting case, firms’ investing and exporting are more like substitutes, see Aw,
Roberts, and Xu (2011)
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in both entry and fixed costs would lead to 8.9% productivity gains for a typical
firms.
My empirical results suggest several key determinants of underlying productivity
growth in the Chinese steel industry. Productivity growth is an endogenous process,
affected by investment and importing activities. Only a small number of firms can
receive benefits from importing because of restrictions, and these firms are less likely
to undertake investment. My result reveals a high entry barrier in the importing
market, i.e. the government authorization, which can have deleterious effects on
firm decision making. This also enhances the self-selection issue since productivity
level is the main factor that drives the participation in the import market, and these
importers become even more productive.
My results provide some possible explanation of low productivity issue in the
Chinese steel industry. Chinese steel producers are highly import dependent on the
main inputs, iron ore, but only a few number of firms have access to the import
market. Many small and medium firms are lack of premium input, and thus lower
down the average productivity level of the entire industry. As a result, import
market participation could be a significant determinant driving firm productivity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 develops a structural
model of demand and cost functions and derives production function. Section 3.3
introduces the method of estimation to recover firm-level productivity, which follows
Aw, Roberts, and Xu (2011), and discusses the selection of investment and importing
behavior. Section 3.4 briefly introduces the data of Chinese steel industry. Section
3.5 and 3.6 present the estimation results and section 3.7 concludes the paper.
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3.2 A Structural Model of Importing and Invest-
ment
In this section, I derive a theoretical model building on previous work which focus on
exporting, investment,and productivity, including Melitz (2003), Das, Roberts, and
Tybout (2007) and Aw, Roberts, and Xu (2011). My model studies importing and
investment as discrete choices, and examines the evolution of productivity. Firm
heterogeneity is characterized by their productivity, capital stocks, and previous
decisions to import and invest, which in turn determine the current decisions con-
cerning importing and investment. As a feedback, current decisions can affect the
future path of productivity growth, where productivity determines both profitability
in the short run and future decisions in the dynamic context.
3.2.1 Static Competition
A non-importing firm i’s marginal cost at year t is specified in equation 3.1
ln cNit = ln c(kit, wt)− ωit = β0 + βk ln kit + βw lnwt − ωit (3.1)
In equation 3.1, kit is the firms’ capital stock, wt is market conditions faced by
all firms, and ωit is firm productivity. Here, I assume each firm produces a single
output and marginal cost is invariant with output level. Firms are differentiated by
their capital stock, which is observed in the data, and their productivity, which is
unobservable in the data.
Meanwhile, I specify a similar cost function for importing firms, except that each
importing firm also has an exogenous cost shifter zit coming from the import market,
which follows the model of the export market as in Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007).
Since importers can access better intermediate inputs to reduce their marginal cost,
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the cost function of importing firms can be written as in equation 3.2.
ln cMit = ln c(kit, wt)− ωit = β0 + βk ln kit + βw lnwt + zit − ωit (3.2)
The final product market is assumed to be monopolistically competitive as in
Melitz (2003), where firms set their prices but have no interaction with each other.
Thus, a single firm faces a Dixit-Stiglitz form of demand curve, given by:
qit = Qt
(
pit
Pt
)η
=
It
Pt
(
pit
Pt
)η
= φt(pit)
η, where φt = ItP
−η−1
t (3.3)
In equation 3.3, Pt and Qt are the aggregate output and price of the industry
respectively, while It is the total expenditure of consumers. Thus, the demand for
a single product depends on aggregate output and price, its own price, and the
elasticity of demand.
With these cost and demand functions, firm i chooses price pit equal to its
marginal cost, to maximize its profit. Following Aw, Roberts, and Xu (2011), this
condition implies the revenue of non-importing firms is:
ln rNit = (η + 1) ln
(
η
η + 1
)
+ lnφt + (η + 1)(β0 + βk ln kit + βw lnwt − ωit) (3.4)
Equation 3.4 implies that revenue is determined by aggregate market conditions
such as the output and price levels as well as the elasticity of demand, and firm
specific conditions such as capital stocks and productivity. Similarly, the importing
firms’ total revenue (in logarithmic form) can be written as:
ln rMit = (η+1) ln
(
η
η + 1
)
+lnφt+(η+1)(β0 +βk ln kit+βw lnwt+zit−ωit) (3.5)
A difference in equation 3.5 is that importers’ revenue not only depends on the
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domestic market conditions and on firms’ specifics, but also on the international
market. Thus, importers’ revenue also contains information from importing mar-
kets. Estimation of these revenue functions can recover two variables reflecting
unobserved firms heterogeneity, zit and ωit. Here, ωit captures unobserved firm het-
erogeneity that affect revenue for both importers and non-importers. zit captures all
sources of revenue heterogeneity arising from importing markets, which are unique
for importers. Thus, zit can be referred to as the import shock from the intermediate
suppliers.
Under the assumptions of demand and marginal cost functions, firms’ profit can
be derived from their revenue. As discussed in Melitz (2003), non-importers’ profit
is proportional to their revenue, determined by the market elasticity of demand η.
piNit = −
1
η
rit(φt, kit, ωit) (3.6)
Here, the revenue is given as in equation 3.4. Similarly, if a firm chooses to
become an importer, then its profit function will include the import shock zit.
piMit = −
1
η
rit(φt, kit, zit, ωit) (3.7)
The equations above can be used to measure firms’ profits from their revenue
data, which determine the decisions of adopting investment and entering the import
market. I develop a dynamic model to show firms’ decisions in the following sections.
3.2.2 Transition of State Variables
For each firm, their state variables include firm productivity ωit, capital stock kit,
supply shock zit, and market condition φt. Following the setting as in Olley and
Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), the evolution of firm productivity is
assumed to be a Markov process which also depends on firms’ status of investment
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and import participation, as well as on an idiosyncratically random shock ξit.
ωit = α0 + α1ωi,t−1 + α2(ωi,t−1)2 + α3(ωi,t−1)3 (3.8)
+α4dit−1 + α5mi,t−1 + ξit
In equation 3.8, productivity ωit follows a non-linear Markov process. Here,
a dummy variable di,t−1 is the status of investment in year t − 1, while mi,t−1 is
another dummy variable of participation in the import market in year t− 1. di,t−1
is included by assuming that investment has a positive effect on firms’ productivity
growth. The importing term mi,t−1 is also included to allow for a positive effect of
better access to the intermediate goods. The stochastic term ξit is an i.i.d. random
variable following a normal distribution with zero mean and variance σ2ξ , which
is uncorrelated with ωi,t−1, di,t−1,mi,t−1. In all, equation 3.8 provides information
about productivity dynamics and incorporates a cubic function of one-period lagged
productivity and the interaction between investment and importing.
Investment and importing choices are modeled as dummy variables, which im-
plies that investing or importing would have the expected impacts on productivity
regardless of the amount of investment or importing. Some empirical studies find
evidence that firms’ productivity is the key determinant of discrete choices, such
as exporting and investment, but not strongly correlated with the levels of such
activities (See Aw, Roberts, and Winston (2007)).
Finally, the import shocks from the suppliers are modeled as a first-order Markov
process (one period lag auto-regression), which is similar to the exporting market
shock as discussed in Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007) and Aw, Roberts, and Xu
(2011).
zit = ρzi,t−1 + µit (3.9)
Here, µit is an i.i.d. random variable with normal distribution with mean zero and
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variance σ2µ. Equation 3.9 differentiates the importers and non-importers, which
is important here since it can capture importers’ attributes in their revenue/profit
function, arising from inputs. The autoregressive process also implies that the im-
port shock has a persistent yet diminishing effect on firms’ revenue and profit in the
future.
3.2.3 Investment and Importing Decisions
In this section, the dynamic decisions on import and invest are modeled. Similar to
dynamic models in the export market (See Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007) and
Aw, Roberts, and Xu (2011)), the first participation in the import market incurs
sunk costs, which implies that the past participation status in the import market is
also a state variable for entry decisions. This sunk cost of import can be interpreted
as the freeness of trade in the international market, and also as a barrier to obtain the
import quotas authorized by the government. A similar sunk cost is also introduced
for firms’ investment decision. Furthermore, there are fixed costs associated with
importing and investment activities. These sunk and fixed costs are associated with
productivity dynamics as in equation 3.8.
Since there are two activities need to identified, assumptions about the activ-
ity sequence are required to address the identification issue here. Thus, firms are
assumed to first observe the sunk cost (γSit) and fixed cost (γ
F
it ) in the importing mar-
ket, then makes their import decisions in year t. Following the import decision, firms
then observe the sunk cost (γIit) and fixed cost (γ
D
it ) associated with investment, and
make their investment decisions. These costs are both time and firm variant which
reflect the difference of technological adoption and expertise (i.e. entrepreneurship),
as well as government preference. Following the assumption in Aw, Roberts, and
Xu (2011), I assume these four underlying costs come from a joint distribution Gγ,
which is going to be estimated.
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In sum, the state variables in year t include market state φt and firm i’s state:
sit = (ωit, kit, zit,mi,t−1, di,t−1)
After observing sunk and fixed costs, the firm’s value function in year t is:
Vit(sit, φt) =
∫
max
mit
{(
piit −mi,t−1γFit − (1−mi,t−1)γSit
)
+ V Mit (sit), V
D
it (sit)
}
dGγ
(3.10)
Here mi,t−1 is a binary variable denoting firm i’s import status in year t− 1. If
firm i imports in year t− 1, then it has to pay the fixed cost (γFit ) to keep importing
in year t; on the other hand, if it does not import in year t−1, it has to pay the sunk
cost (γSit) to enter the import market. V
M
it is the value of an importing firm after
making its optimal investment decision, and V Dit is the value of a non-importing
firm after making its optimal investment decision. Equation 3.10 shows that a non-
importing firm chooses to enter the import market in year t when the present and
expected future profit exceeds the associated sunk and fixed costs. Similarly, the
value function of an importing firm with its optimal investment decision is:
V Mit (sit, φt) =
∫
max
dit
{
δEtVi,t+1(si,t+1|mit = 1, dit = 1)− di,t−1γIit − (1− di,t−1)γDit ,
δEtVi,t+1(si,t+1|mit = 1, dit = 0)} dGγ (3.11)
Equation 3.11 also shows a similar trade-off between the costs associated with
investment and the post-investment pay-offs for those firms that decide to import.
The associated costs with investment depends on previous investment decisions. If
a firm does not make an investment in year t− 1, then it has to pay the sunk cost
(γIit), but not the fixed cost (γ
D
it ); otherwise, it only needs to pay the fixed cost (γ
D
it ).
The sunk cost of investment could be interpreted as the start-up cost, while the
fixed cost of investment could come from the adoption of new technologies. If a firm
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chooses to make an investment, then it has a different productivity growth path in
the future. The stronger the impact on firms’ productivity growth, the more likely
a firm will make an investment. Similarly, the value of a non-importing firms with
its optimal investment decision is:
V Dit (sit, φt) =
∫
max
dit
{
δEtVi,t+1(si,t+1|mit = 0, dit = 1)− di,t−1γIit − (1− di,t−1)γDit ,
δEtVi,t+1(si,t+1|mit = 0, dit = 0)} dGγ (3.12)
The trade-off still exists in equation 3.12, but the change of productivity path is
for non-importing firms. Finally, the expected value function conditional on invest-
ment and importing decisions can be written as:
EtVi,t+1(si,t+1, φt|mit, dit) =
∫
φ′
∫
z′
∫
ω′
Vi,t+1(s
′)dF (ω′|ωit,mit, dit)dF (z′|zit)dG(φ′|φt)
(3.13)
Equation 3.13 is a three-fold integration over the sate space (ωit, zit and φt).
As shown in equation 3.8, productivity dynamics depend on their importing and
investment status. From equation 3.13, we can see that the expected value function
is larger for higher productivity levels, thus, in this dynamic model, V Mit (.) and V
D
it (.)
are larger, ceteris paribus, for more productive firms. This leads to a self-selection
issue when more productive firms tend to conduct both investment and import.
Since the model allows productivity to evolve endogenously, firms that both import
and invest, would tend to keep their status in the future.
In this dynamic discrete choice model, firm heterogeneity is reflected in their pre-
vious status in importing and investing activities, capital stock, productivity and
import shocks. These state variables together determine firms’ revenue, thus profit.
These productivity effects, taking required sunk and fixed costs into account, result
in the optimal choices on investing and importing. I will show how to estimate struc-
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tural parameters in the model, including those in static cost and demand functions,
productivity evolution and costs parameters in the next section.
3.2.4 Equilibrium
In this section, I summarize my model and show the equilibrium which follows the
frame work by Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy (2008). As discussed above, in
each period t, firm i’s state variables sit ∈ S includes market condition φt ∈ φ,
import shocks zit, capital stock kit, productivity ωit and previous status mit−1, dit−1.
A symmetric Markov Perfect Strategies can be defined as an action ait ∈ A, where
ait = {mit, dit} in my case. particularly,
mit : S× φ→ {0, 1}
is each firm’s importing strategy, and
dit : S× φ→ {0, 1}
is each firm’s investment strategy. As in the last section, EtVi,t+1(si,t+1, φt|ait) is
the value function as the expected discounted payoffs at firm i’s state and market
state φt. We can interpret a part of market state φt includes information that firm i
chooses strategy a′ ∈ A and others choose strategy a ∈ A. Then a Markov Perfect
Equilibrium strategies a satisfies that
EtVi,t+1(si,t+1, φt|ait, a−it) ≥ EtVi,t+1(si,t+1, φt|a′it, a−it),∀a′it ∈ A
The equilibrium presented above follows Weintraub, Benkard, and Van Roy
(2008). They show that when the number of firms is large, firms’ strategies, which
ignore rivals’ state s−it but condition on the average market (industrial) state, can
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well approximate a Markov Perfect Equilibrium. They argue that when there are
many firms and the market is not concentrated, each firm cannot benefit by deviat-
ing to another strategy by keeping track on the aggregate market state. As discussed
in the following sections, their argument is applicable in my studies here. Therefore,
the strategy defined above can approximate the Markov Perfect Strategy. Thus, in
each period, each firm keeps track on the market condition φt, and solve their opti-
mization problem individually. Then, the industry equilibrium can be calculated as
a result.
3.2.5 Gains from Import
From the model, we can see that the benefits from importing can be measured by
comparing value functions which endogenize the importing choice. Also, these value
functions are increasing by productivity level, which result in a self-selection issue,
i.e. more productive firms are more likely to import. Furthermore, since there are
two choices, import and investment, the net return to import also depends on the
choice of investment. In this section, I discuss the gains from importing.
We can define the marginal gains from importing as the difference between value
function V Mit (.), which is the value function of importers, and V
D
it (.), which is the
value function of non-importers. The gains from importing also depends on the
previous choice of investment due to the sunk cost and fixed cost associated with
investment. The gains from importing can be calculated from value functions as in
equation 3.14
GImportit (sit, φt|dit−1) = V Mit (sit,φt|dit−1)− V Dit (sit,φt|dit−1) (3.14)
Costs associated with investment and importing endogenize these choices, there-
fore the self-selection issue is under control in equation 3.14. In the following sec-
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tions, I show the estimation of parameters in my model step by step and quantify
the gains from import.
3.3 Empirical Estimation
In this section, I develop an empirical model which corresponds to the structural
model in previous sections to recover the parameters in demand and cost functions,
as well as in the dynamic discrete choice model. The estimation is processed in
two stages. In the first stage, the parameters in the demand and cost functions are
estimated, and then the firm level productivity and the import shock (ωit, zit) are
constructed accordingly. In the second stage, a dynamic discrete choice model on
investment and importing choices is estimated. The dynamic estimation will recover
the sunk and fixed costs associated with these two activities. Therefore, my model
allows for the estimation of the market elasticity of demand η, the aggregate indus-
trial condition φt, parameters in the cost function (equation 3.1 and 3.2), parameters
in the productivity function (equation 3.8), parameter of importing market shocks
(equation 3.9).
3.3.1 Demand and Cost Estimation
First, I jointly estimate the demand, cost, and productivity functions. According
to equations 3.4 and 3.5, the unobserved error term −(1 + η)ωit + uit represents
productivity level. I follow Olley and Pakes (1996) and proxy for the unobserved
productivity term using observed variables to control the endogeneity of capital
stock. As discussed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), the intermediate expenditure
eit is a better proxy than the lagged capital stock, because it changes more smoothly
than capital stock. Here I use total wage payment as a proxy for the intermediate
expenditure. Since the marginal cost is assumed to be constant, the marginal in-
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termediate expenditure does not depend on total output or the import shocks zit.
Recall that productivity is correlated with capital stocks; both capital stock and
wage payment enter the productivity function (equation 3.8), ωit(ln kit, ln eit). Since
the aggregate demand shock and market conditions are only time variant, I construct
time dummies Dt to control for these factors. Combining the revenue function for
importers and non-importers, the revenue function can be re-written as follows:
ln rit = γ0 +
T∑
t=1
γtDt + (1 + η)(βk ln kit + zit1Import − ωit) + uit (3.15)
= γ0 +
T∑
t=1
γtDt + g(kit, eit) + vit
In equation 3.15, the error term vit is equal to zit1import + uit where 1import is
a dummy variable denoting importing firms. The function g(kit, eit) captures the
combined effect of capital and productivity, which is specified as a cubic function
of ln kit and ln eit. The import shock zit is directly estimated from equation 3.15.
The composite error term vit is serially correlated for importers, but i.i.d. for non-
importers, which makes it possible to separate zit and uit for importers. The fitted
value of function g(.) is an estimation of (1 + η)(βk ln kit − ωit). Therefore, the
productivity term is:
ωit = − 1
1 + η
gˆ(.) + βk ln kit (3.16)
Substituting equation 3.16 into equation 3.8, we can get:
gˆit(.) = βk(1 + η) ln kit − α0(1 + η) + α1(gˆi,t−1 − βk(1 + η) ln ki,t−1) (3.17)
− α2
1 + η
(gˆi,t−1 − βk(1 + η) ln ki,t−1)2 + α3
(1 + η)2
(gˆi,t−1 − βk(1 + η) ln ki,t−1)3
−α4(1 + η)di,t−1 − α5(1 + η)mi,t−1 − α6(1 + η)di,t−1mi,t−1 − ξit(1 + η)
Equation 3.17 is estimated to recover the parameters in the demand and cost
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functions. Here, the elasticity of demand η is measured by the average profit margin
over all firms, as in equations 3.6 and 3.7. Finally, the productivity term can be
constructed by:
ωˆit = − 1
1 + ηˆ
gˆit + βˆk ln kit (3.18)
So far, I estimate a static empirical model derived from the theoretical model.
Particularly, I recover parameters in demand and cost functions, and construct firm
level productivity and import shocks (ωit and zit), controlling for the simultaneity
problem. The estimation results of the static empirical model will be used to es-
timate dynamic decisions. Firms choose whether to undertake investment and/or
importing, based on these individual and aggregate conditions.
3.3.2 Estimate Firms Decisions
In this section, I analyze investment and importing decisions. As the basis of dy-
namic models of firms’ entry in export markets (See Roberts and Tybout (1997)
and Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007)), previous status is the key determinants in
firms’ behavior. Decisions on investment and import are binary variables. I use the
current productivity and capital stock, as well as previous importing/investing sta-
tus, to predict current decisions. So each firm’s decision is based on the likelihood
function for the observed firms’ status (mi,t−1, di,t−1 and kit) and unobserved status
(ωit). Firm i’s contribution to its probabilities of importing and investment can be
written as:
P (mit, dit|ωit, kit,mi,t−1, di,t−1) (3.19)
This reduced form equation (equation 3.19) demonstrates the joint decision on
investment and importing (mit and dit). The probabilities in year t are conditional
on firm i’s current and previous state variables. The previous status of importing and
investment are included to capture the transition patterns. I use the probit model to
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estimate the reduced form probability which measures the basic relationship between
importing and investing decisions and productivity levels.
The fixed and sunk costs for importing and investment activities can be estimated
via discrete choices by firms to participate in the import market and to conduct
investment. Firms’ participation in the import market can reveal information about
sunk cost γSit and fixed cost γ
F
it associated with importing. Similarly, decisions
regarding investment can reflect information on sunk cost γIit and on fixed cost γ
D
it
associated with investment. Here, these costs are i.i.d. exponential distribution
across all firms in every year.
The dynamic estimation is based on the likelihood function for the observed pat-
terns of importing and investment status. Using the parameters recovered from the
static model, firm i in year t’s likelihood function follows equation 3.19. Assuming
the sunk and fixed costs are i.i.d. for each firm, the joint distributions of (mit, dit)
are the product of marginal distributions of mit and dit. The dynamic model devel-
oped above leads us to the conditional probabilities of import market participation
and investment decisions, considering the associated costs. Firms participate in
the import markets after comparing the pre-entry costs and the expected post-entry
pay-off (the expected increase of value function in the future). Thus, the probability
to enter the import market can be written as in equation 3.20.
P (mit = 1 | sit) = P (mi,t−1γFit + (1−mi,t−1)γSit ≤ V Mit − V Dit ) (3.20)
Investment decisions comes from comparing associated costs and the expected
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pay-off. Conditional probability of investing is shown in equation 3.21:4
P (dit = 1 | sit) = P (di,t−1γIit + (1− di,t−1)γDit ≤ (3.21)
δEtVi,t+1(sit+1 | mit, dit = 1)− δEtVi,t+1(sit+1 | mit, dit = 0))
The probabilities of import and investment decision depend on the value func-
tions EtVi,t+1, V
M
it and V
D
it . The estimation of these value functions as well as the
cost parameters follows a Bayesian Monte Carlo Markov Chain approach proposed
by Aw, Roberts, and Xu (2011). The difference is that the import shock zit is
directly estimated in the static model.
3.4 Data
The model derived above is used to analyze productivity growth in the Chinese steel
industry. I employ firm-level data which is collected by the Chinese Statistic Bureau
(CSB) for the years 2000-2006 from its annual enterprize survey. It is supplemented
with firm-level import information from Chinese Custom data. Finally, these micro
data is combined with some macro-level statistics from the Chinese Statistics Year
Books to capture aggregate market conditions. The annual survey of Chinese man-
ufacturing is concentrated on large and medium size firms in China which have total
annual sales more than 5 million RMB (approximately 0.7 million in US dollars). It
covers 95% of total market value and thus provides a representative data source for
the firm level study.
Steel is a fast-growing sector in China, expanding by an average of 20% every
year in the sample period. China is now the largest steel maker in the world. In
2008, Chinese total output of crude steel accounted for 38% of world production.
4Note here, mit enters the state variable vector since the theoretical model assume that firms
investment decision is made after import decision.
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In spite of this, the Chinese steel producers have generally maintained a very low
profitability level (3%), compared with other Chinese manufacturing sectors (6%)
or with steel producers in other countries (10%). Furthermore, the Chinese steel
industry is highly import dependent on its inputs, iron ore. More than 70% of iron
ore demand in China is repliant on imports, mainly from Australia, Brazil, and India.
In 2008, China consumed more than 50% of the world iron ore supply.5 Overall,
the Chinese steel industry provides an excellent example to study the relationship
among investment, importing and productivity growth.
The data I use is a balanced panel of 569 firms over 7 years.6 A rich set of financial
and accounting variables are reported in the dataset, such as total sales, capital
stocks, and investment. Table 3.1 shows some summary statistics (number of firms
and their size (measured by their revenue)) over the sample period, differentiated
into importing firms and non-importing firms. We can see only about 4% of firms
import in the sample period, and there is a clear difference between importers and
non-importers. Both importers and non-importers have experienced rapid growth
in their sales (which is used here to proxy for revenue). However, sales of importers
are almost seven times as that of non-importers on average. This is similar for
profitability, i.e. importers are on average larger and more profitable.
For investment, we can see that levels of investment by non-importers is far below
that of importers during the sample period. The average investments of importers
are more than ten times those of non-importers in 2006. Since the steel industry is
a highly capital intensive and material dependent, importers expand their market
shares by more investment and access to better raw materials, which lead to a high
level of profitability.
5According to the Chinese Steel Association.
6First, I follow the Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2011) method to merge the firm level
data over years, and add the import information from the Chinese custom data. My analysis
focus on firms who survive through all the sample period with SIC number 3200, which indicates
the ferrous metal refinery. In order to exclude the effect from entrants on market structure, my
analysis only focus on the incumbents.
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Table 3.1: Importers vs. Non-Importers: 2000-2006
year Non-Importers Importers
# of Firms Sales Invest Profit # of Firms Sales Invest Profit
2000 547 455 35 2.1% 22 2752 249 6.4%
2001 544 520 43 1.6% 25 2630 152 9.3%
2002 539 520 35 2.0% 30 3660 278 8.2%
2003 546 790 52 2.5% 23 6031 204 9.5%
2004 533 959 52 3.5% 36 9340 488 10%
2005 540 1276 64 4.2% 29 13671 934 5.3%
2006 544 1364 87 3.3% 25 19186 1328 6.8%
Note: millions of RMB, in mean level
3.4.1 Empirical Pattern for Import and Investment
The empirical model of the last section explains decision process in investment
and import market participation. Here, I summarize some empirical patterns of
transition probabilities. It is useful to understand the underlying factors driving
inter-temporal decisions. Table 3.2 shows transition probabilities for investing and
importing participation conditional on the last period status of a firm. The first
row reports the unconditional distribution of firms’ activities over all the sample
period. It shows that in each year, 61% of firms do neither investment nor importing.
Meanwhile, 33% of firms make investment but do not import, and 0.6% of importing
firms do not make investment. There are 0.1% of firms involve both activities. In
all, 217 firms (represent 38% of observations) involve into at least one of these two
activities for at least one year.
Table 3.2: Firms’ Annual Transition Rates
Status at Year T Status at Year T + 1
Neither Invest only Import Only Both
All 0.615 0.337 0.007 0.001
Neither 0.924 0.074 0.002 0.000
Invest only 0.125 0.839 0.002 0.035
Import only 0.273 0.046 0.546 0.136
Both 0.007 0.259 0.021 0.713
Note: Numbers in the matrix measure the proportion of
firms in two status at two neighboring period
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The second to fifth row in Table 3.2 shows several clear patterns of each activity
from year t to year t+ 1. First, status is significantly persistent over year. If a firm
does not invest nor import in year t, then it has 92% possibility of doing neither in
year t+ 1. Similarly, firms that only invest or import have 84% and 55% stay in the
same status, and 71% of firms that involve both activities in year t keep undertaking
both activities in year t+ 1.
Second, firms that invest or import in year t tend to start the other activity
in year t + 1, especially for importers without investment in year t. We can see
18% of importers that make no investment in year t involve both activities in year
t + 1. However, if a firm makes neither of the two decisions in year t, it has very
low probability to involve in any of these two activities in year t+ 1.
Third, non-importers without investment in year t tend to do neither activity
again in year t + 1, although they show a small probability of starting investment.
In the third row, we can see that within firms that only invest in year t, 87% of
them would probably invest again in year t+1, and with a small probability to enter
importing markets. Furthermore, we can find in the third row of Table 3.2 that if
a firm enters importing market in year t, it would stay in importing markets and
start to invest, and a similar distribution can be found in the fifth row.
Fourth, firms that undertake both activities are less likely to give up either. We
can see in the last row of Table 3.2 that only 2% of firms that conduct both activities
in year t stop investing in year t + 1. On the other hand, firms in import markets
without investing in year t have small chance to give up their import status in year
t + 1, but 13% of non-importing firms with investment in year t stop investing in
year t+ 1. In all, importing status has a dominant effect on firms’ decisions on both
of these two activities.
Table 3.2 shows the need to model investment and importing decisions jointly.
Firms undertaking one or both of investment and importing would have higher
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capital stock and productivity levels which results in a self-selection issue in firms’
decisions. Meanwhile, status in investment and importing would affect productivity
evolution as a feedback. Finally, the return of investment on productivity is probably
conditional on import status, thus importing firms enjoy more benefits in their
productivity growth from their own investment .
3.5 Estimation Result
3.5.1 Static Model Estimation Result
The first stage estimation on equation 3.6, equation 3.7 and equation 3.17 is reported
in Table 3.3.7
Table 3.3: Demand, Cost and Productivity Dynamic Parameter Estimation
Parameters Discrete Invest Continuous Invest
η -9.3204*** -9.3204***
(1.1761) (1.1761)
ln kit -0.0454*** -0.0457***
(0.0007) (0.0007)
ωit−1 0.9116*** 0.9046***
(0.0126) (0.0126)
ω2it−1 0.7875*** 0.7437***
(0.0841) (0.0838)
ω3it−1 -1.9093*** -1.9230***
(0.2908) (0.2928)
dit−1 0.0051*** 0.0010***
(0.0016) (0.0002)
mit−1 0.0052** 0.0052*
(0.0032) (0.0031)
N 2790 2790
R2 97.6% 97.6%
Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.15, ∗ ∗ p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.05
From Table 3.3, we can see that the estimated price elasticity of demand is high
(η = −9.32), which implies the profitability level is 10% (profit over sales value).
The coefficient on ln kit estimates the effect of capital stock on firms’ marginal cost
7I use the bootstrap method to estimate η from the coefficient
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in firms’ cost function βk. It is negative and significant as expected, which implies
that marginal cost is lower for firms with higher capital stock.
The coefficients in the productivity dynamics (equation 3.8) reveals several inter-
esting facts. The coefficients ωit−1, ω2it−1 and ω
3
it−1 reflect a non-linear relationship
between lagged and current productivity. They shows the marginal effect from the
lagged productivity displays a concave shape. The coefficients of dit−1 and mit−1 tell
the short-run effect of investment and import status on firms productivity. The co-
efficient of dit−1 captures the direct effect of investment in year t−1 on productivity
level in year t, and it is positive and significant, which implies a 0.51% productivity
premium. The direct effect of last year import status on current productivity is
measured by coefficient of mit−1 which is significantly positive, which implies that
importing firms have on average 0.52% higher productivity. Such productivity im-
pacts could come from better raw material and “learning by importing,” and it is
much higher than that for investment. Considering coefficients of dit−1 and mit−1,
we can see that firms that engage into both activities have productivity 1% higher
than who do neither (0.6% in continuous investment case).
The coefficients of dit−1 and mit−1 can also measure the long-run effect of invest-
ment and importing on productivity. Compared with a firm who never undertakes
investment or importing, a firm which has both activities will have a mean pro-
ductivity that is 3.72% higher. A firm which only does investment will be 1.84%
more productive, while a firm which only engages in importing will be 1.88% more
productive in the long run. These facts for the long-run effects provide a linkage
among investment, import and productivity growth.
Finally, I construct the estimation of firm level productivity from equation 3.17.
The average productivity estimates is 0.038, with 5% and 95% percentile equal to
(-0.106, 0.288). The distribution of productivity is important to display firm het-
erogeneity and explain firms’ self-selection in the investment and import decisions.
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3.5.2 Investment and Importing Decisions
The estimation result of the static model recovers firm level productivity and market
conditions. These results can be used to measure the correlation of decisions on
investment and importing. Table 3.5 reports the result of the probit estimations of
investing and importing decisions on several variables including productivity level,
capital stocks (in logarithmic form), previous decisions. These probit model can tell
the correlation of different firm heterogeneity with importing and investment status.
The estimation results are shown in table 3.5.
Table 3.4: Investment and Importing Decisions, probit model with controlling year effects
Variables Investment Importing
mi,t−1 0.0859 2.1774***
(0.1723) (0.1422)
di,t−1 2.3848*** 0.3170***
(0.0653) (0.1463)
ωit 0.3804 2.7673***
(0.3059) (0.7163)
ln kit 0.1635*** 0.0555
(0.0253) (0.0504)
N 3414 3414
Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.15, ∗ ∗ p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.05
In table 3.5, positive effects of productivity on import participation indicates that
more productive firms tend to import their raw materials. Similarly, the positively
significant coefficient of capital in the investment equation reveals a positive rela-
tionship between capital stock and investing. Since the capital stock can measure
firms size, table 3.5 also tells that larger firms tend to make investment.
On the other hand, the productivity term does not show a positive relationship
with the investment activity. This result reflects that more productive firm tend not
to make investment although investment has a limited productivity effect. Combin-
ing with the result in the last section, we can see that there is a strong correlation
between productivity and importing.
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The lagged variables (mi,t−1 and di,t−1) both have positive effects on each other
at the current year. This implies that firms’ investment and importing activities are
correlated. Particularly, the previous investment has a significantly positive effect
on the importing decision, which means firms need to make a investment to increase
their productivity and size in order to access the import market. It would imply an
entry barrier in the import market. And there is no significant correlation between
lagged importing and current investment.
In all, the estimation results of the probit model reveal that investment and
importing activities have positive effects on each other. Productivity and capital
stocks positively affect these decisions. Combined these results with productivity
dynamics, we can see that, importing status plays a dominant role in productivity
evolution as well as in investment and importing decisions. Particularly, we can
see that importers enjoy a productivity premium and more productive firms tend
to import. Investment has limited effect on firms productivity growth, yet it can
improve productivity by increasing the capital stock, which results in larger firms
tending to undertake investment.
Overall, it should be recognized that productivity, constructed by the struc-
tural estimation, captures firm heterogeneity which is correlated with decisions to
invest and import. Since productivity can be directly connected to profitability,
the correlation between productivity and importing can explain the low and skewed
distribution of firms’ profitability in the Chinese steel industry.
A large number of small and medium firms are blocked from the import market,
and they cannot access to premium inputs. On the other hand, their investment
is not effective enough to improve their productivity level. Meanwhile, a few of
large importing firms with high productivity level enjoy a lot of benefits from the
import market, and they become even more productive and profitable. As a result,
the profitability in the Chinese steel industry has a low average level and a highly
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skewed distribution.
3.5.3 Dynamic Model Estimation Result
The remaining parameters are the costs associated with importing and investment
activities, which are estimated in the second stage estimation of the dynamic model.
These parameters are estimated by the likelihood function which is the product over
the joint-probability of these two activities of each firm, as given in equation 3.19.
γI , γD, γF , and γS measure, respectively, exponential distributions of fixed cost of
investment, sunk cost of investment, fixed cost of import and sunk cost of import.
The coefficients in table 3.5 are the means and standard deviation of the posterior
distribution of the parameters from the MCMC simulation (See the algorithm in
the appendix)
Table 3.5: Dynamic Parameter Estimation
Parameters Coefficients Std. Err.
γS (Import SC) 1341.8200*** (230.9707)
γF (Import FC) 713.7533*** (251.8825)
γD (Investment SC) 14.1378 (41.0510)
γI (Investment FC) 37.9048*** (4.9697)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.15, ∗ ∗ p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.05
Note: Means and Standard Error of the Posterior
Distribution, in million RMB
These costs associated with importing and investment reveal the underlying de-
terminants that drive importing and investment decisions. First, we can see that the
costs associated with importing are much higher than that with investment. Par-
ticularly, there is no significant sunk cost for investment. It is much easier for firms
to start new investment than to enter the import market. Second, the sunk cost of
importing (γS) is higher than the import fixed cost (γF ), which means that entering
the importing market is more difficult than keeping the importing status. In other
words, import market entrants face a higher barrier than incumbents. However, the
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costs associated with investment are different. The fixed cost of investment is higher
than its sunk cost. This implies that it is easier to start a new investment but there
would be a lot of expense with it in the later years.
Compared with profit, we can find the magnitude of these costs. First, the entry
cost of import is more than 15 times as the average profit by Chinese steel firms.
The fixed cost of import, which is faced by the importers, is also about 8 times as
the average profit. These costs associated with importing block many firms away
from the import market. In my sample data, there are only 4% observations have
import record. Second, the sunk cost of investment is insignificant while the fixed
cost of investment is about 40% of the average profit. These relatively low costs
associated with investment result in more firms involved into invest than importing.
Since the import market access is controlled by the government with import per-
mits, the sunk cost of importing can be interpreted as obtaining permission to access
the foreign suppliers. Many small and medium firms cannot get such permission.
On the other hand, since the steel industry is highly capital intensive, it requires
large amount of investment to maintain, replace and upgrade refinery equipment. It
is relatively easier to start a new investment, compared with importing, since there
is no similar government hurdles. However, there would be a lot of other expendi-
tures associated with new investment, such as managerial cost and accounting cost
from bank loans and adoption of new technologies.
The estimation of productivity dynamic shows a stronger effect of importing
on productivity growth, but many firms are blocked from the import market thus
cannot enjoy the benefits from imported raw materials. While many firms can easily
undertake investment, but due to the limited effect of investment on productivity
growth, many firms maintain a low level of productivity.
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3.5.4 In Sample Performance
In order to assess my model, I use the estimated parameters to simulate the import
and investment decisions, and then compare the simulated pattern with the real
data pattern. Here, productivity, importing and investment are all endogenous
from firm inter-temporal optimization. Each firm, based on its conditions (capital
stock, productivity, etc.) at the initial year (2000), chooses its optimal strategies
on importing and investment. Then, productivity evolves accordingly. Thus, I only
use firm information in the initial year, and simulate all the years information after
then.
First, I compare the mean level of participation rate of importing and investment
for each year. Table 3.6 shows that my model generate a decent result. The overall
correlation between real data and simulated data is around 40%, with particularly
better results in late years.
Table 3.6: Import and Investment Participation Rates
Importing Investment
Year Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
2000 0.039 0.011 0.350 0.132
2001 0.044 0.014 0.369 0.142
2002 0.053 0.019 0.392 0.153
2003 0.040 0.030 0.401 0.204
2004 0.063 0.046 0.390 0.234
2005 0.051 0.056 0.381 0.257
2006 0.044 0.063 0.366 0.271
Second, I generate the transition matrix for the predicted data. Compare table
3.2 with table 3.7, we can see that my predictions are closed to the actual data,
particularly in the second and third rows. These two groups are firms that have no
activity and that only have investment only. These two groups account for 96.5%
of the sample observations. However, the transition of importing is hard to fit very
well, although this group only takes less than 5% of the sample observations. In all,
the predicted transition matrix is close to the real data pattern we observed.
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Table 3.7: Firms’ Annual Transition Rates: Predicted
Predicted Data
Status at Year T Status at Year T + 1
Neither Invest only Import Only Both
All 0.8012 0.1647 0.0000 0.0018
Neither 0.9465 0.0517 0.0000 0.0000
Invest only 0.0465 0.8978 0.0000 0.0558
Import only 0.0427 0.0000 0.9275 0.0298
Both 0.0000 0.0000 0.0200 0.9800
3.6 Free Trade in Import Market
Trade liberalization for imports means lower entry cost and thus more firms could
access to foreign suppliers. As a result, there would be an improvement in productiv-
ity. Moreover, due to the correlation between investment and importing activities,
firms would be more likely to be involved in the investment which would further
increase their productivity.
In this section, I first calculate the gains from importing via equation 3.14 us-
ing the estimated value functions. Table 3.8 shows the results. We can see first
that the gains from importing is all positive for firms with different productivity
level. Second, gains from importing is increasing by productivity level. This means
that more productive firms get more benefits from importing, even after control-
ling for the self-selection issue. Third, gains from importing for investing firms is
slightly higher than the non-investing firm while such difference is smaller for more
productive firms.
Then, a counterfactual exercise is conducted here to show the change of firm
productivity by reducing the costs in the import market. Each firm optimize its
choice of importing after observing the new sunk cost and fixed cost in the import-
ing market. In my model, the decrease of the sunk cost and fixed cost can increase
the post-entry value function for non-importers, and the decrease of the fixed cost
can increase the value function of importers so that they are more likely to keep
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Table 3.8: Gains from Importing (million RMB)
VMt V
D
t G
Import = VMt − V Dt
ωit dt−1 = 1 dt−1 = 0 dt−1 = 1 dt−1 = 0 dt−1 = 1 dt−1 = 0
-0.2220 781.04 780.99 777.98 777.94 3.06 3.05
-0.1151 796.66 796.57 792.37 792.29 4.29 4.28
-0.0082 826.02 825.82 819.57 819.39 6.45 6.43
0.0987 877.52 877.10 867.76 867.38 9.76 9.72
0.2056 959.21 958.45 945.34 944.64 13.87 13.81
0.3124 1072.06 1070.91 1054.25 1053.16 17.81 17.75
0.4193 1206.51 1205.02 1185.88 1184.43 20.63 20.59
0.5262 1344.91 1343.25 1323.16 1321.52 21.75 21.73
0.6331 1468.98 1467.27 1447.50 1445.79 21.48 21.48
importing and enjoy the productivity increase from importing. I process my exper-
iments with two reductions in γS and γF , by 10% and by 90%. My simulation is
processed similarly as in the last section to simulate the industrial evolution after
the initial year.
Table 3.9 shows the change of mean level of productivity under different cost
reductions in each year. We can see an increase in firm productivity across years.
With 10% decrease in sunk cost and fixed cost associates with importing, the mean
productivity could increase by 8.9% on average, such increase is even more for 90%
decrease in these costs. Since the productivity term directly enter the cost function,
increase in productivity results in decrease in marginal cost.
Table 3.9: Average Productivity Level from Cost Reduction
Reduce γS , γF
Year Original 10% 90%
2000 0.0709 0.0709 0.0709
2001 0.0901 0.0954 0.0913
2002 0.1217 0.1287 0.1360
2003 0.1497 0.1647 0.1827
2004 0.1783 0.1978 0.2237
2005 0.2017 0.2232 0.2594
2006 0.2250 0.2478 0.2893
77
3.7 Conclusion
This paper estimates a structural model to construct firms’ productivity and mea-
sures its linkage with both investment and importing activities. It characterizes
joint decisions on investing and importing depending on productivity level, import
market conditions, capital stock and prior decisions on investing and importing.
Moreover, it also explains how these decisions can affect the productivity evolution
endogenously. The model is estimated using firm-level data from the Chinese steel
industry between 2000-2006.
Several conclusions can be drawn here. First, productivity dynamic is an en-
dogenous process, responding to investment and importing decisions. Compared
with firms which undertake neither activities, in the long run, importing behavior
alone can increase their productivity by 1.9%, while investment alone has limited
effect; and conducting both can increase productivity by 3.2%. Second, the marginal
returns to investment and importing are increasing with productivity levels, suggest-
ing more productive firms enjoy more benefits from both activities. Since these two
activities have positive feedbacks on productivity growth, this reinforces the self-
selection that more productive firms are more involved in both activities. Third,
there is a huge entry cost in the importing market, which is more that ten times of
the average profit level, and also a high level of fixed cost associated with importing.
These costs keep many small and medium firms away from the importing market,
thus these firms cannot enjoy the productivity effect from importing. Fourth, the
sunk cost and fixed cost associated with investment is small which allow more firms
undertake investment, but the productivity effect from investment is limited. Fi-
nally, my counter factual experiment shows a significant effect on productivity from
the import costs reduction, i.e. only 10% decrease in sunk cost and fixed cost from
the import market can increase firm productivity by 8.9% on average.
In all, these empirical findings reveal the role of firm heterogeneity in their pro-
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ductivity which drives the Chinese steel makers to make investment as well as their
import markets participation. The relationship between productivity and decisions
to invest and import lead to a self-selection issue which distinguishes the perfor-
mance of importing and non-importing firms. On the other hand, my results also
reveal the importance of import market participation. Free access to better raw
material could contribute to a large amount of productivity gains.
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